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“A jurisdictional train wreck.” 1 
I. RECONSTRUCTING A TRAIN WRECK 
Three unrelated decisions from the United States Supreme Court 
initiated a tectonic shift in the separation of power in American law.  
These three decisions reconfigure and re-sculpt traditional judicial 
deference afforded to the executive branch.  Together these decisions 
alter Chevron deference.2 These decisions change interpretation of the 
separation of power in U.S. constitutional law.   
Chevron was an environmental dispute interpreting the federal 
Clean Air Act, and these three recent Court decisions similarly interpret 
other provisions of the same Act.  The Supreme Court, de novo, in 
Michigan v. EPA, mandated a new quantitative cost consideration as the 
regulatory prerequisite before the executive branch may enact legally 
defensible regulations.3  A year after the Michigan decision, in West 
Virginia v. EPA,4 the Supreme Court took an unprecedented step:  More 
than two years before a legal challenge could reach it or was argued 
before the lower court,5 and within less than three weeks of an 
application, the Court applied a stay directly to the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule, rather than to 
a lower court judicial decision on appeal, and no party in the matter was 
able to point to any previous instance of this.  The movants’ applications 
for a stay and its granting heavily relied on Michigan v. EPA,6 and UARG 
 
 1. Lynn Garner, FERC Comm’rs Split on Party Lines Over EPA’s Carbon Rule for 
Power Plants, BLOOMBERG BNA ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (July 29, 2014), 
http://info.bna.com/climate/summary_news.aspx?ID=274977. Congressional testimony in 
2014 by FERC Commissioner Clark characterized the conflict between proposed 
environmental regulation in the CPP to assist climate goals and the pressing counter 
requirement to protect power system reliability and resiliency. 
 2. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 3. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 4. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
 5. Id.; see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court put the brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 9 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-
plan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f7; Erin Ryan, The Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court’s Stay 
and Irreparable Harm, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 2016, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/the-clean-power-plan-the-_b_9259858.html. 
 6. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08. 
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v. EPA,7 analyzed in detail below.8  This stay of the CPP embodies in 
law a progressive retreat from the mainstay of Chevron deference for 
agency decisions embodied in recent Supreme Court decisions, analyzed 
below, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,9 King v. Burwell,10 and 
Michigan v. EPA.11  These cases shift the balance of power to construe 
Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts. 
Along with the Court reconfiguring executive branch power, the 
approach and methods of the executive branch also changed.  In this 
simmering constitutional law, new legal ingredients were added with the 
change from the Obama Administration to the Trump Administration.  
The Obama Administration calculated and claimed estimated net global 
benefits of its Clean Power Plan addressing global warming; in 2017, the 
Trump Administration instituted  ‘America first’ accounting which now 
renders the program no longer cost-justified under accounting for only 
U.S. benefits.12  Changes in the legal mathematical algorithm create 
night versus day differences in whether the same executive branch 
regulation is cost-justified, depending on whether one counts: 
 Climate change mitigation benefits occurring outside the United 
States, over which U.S. law has no legal jurisdiction, and across 
borders which U.S. regulation does not reach 
 Indirect so-called “co-benefits” that the Clean Power Plan does not 
address13 
This article navigates this fundamental new Supreme Court 
redetermination of constitutional separation of powers.  The Supreme 
Court decisions construe power over one of the most significant 
controversies of the twenty-first century—control of and remedies for 
escalating global warming.  Even though the Supreme Court’s indefinite 
stay of executive action in West Virginia suspends national climate 
 
 7. Utility Air Recognition Group (UARG) v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013). The 
application of the twenty-nine states for a stay referred to and relied on UARG v. EPA 
throughout. 
 8. See infra Section IV.B-C; W. Va. v. EPA, No. 15A773 (Feb. 9, 2016) 2016 WL 
502947 (mem.). 
 9. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444 (disfavoring new agency interpretation). 
 10. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (disregarding opinion of non-
expert agencies). 
 11. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs 
before regulation). 
 12. See EPA, EPA TAKES ANOTHER STEP TO ADVANCE PRESIDENT TRUMP’S 
AMERICAN FIRST STRATEGY, PROPOSES REPEAL OF ‘CLEAN POWER PLAN’ (Oct. 10, 2017) 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-
america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal. The repeal of the CPP is estimated by the Trump 
Administration EPA to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided compliance costs in 2030. 
 13. See id. Instead of considering global climate benefits, the Trump administration EPA 
now only shows domestic benefits. 
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policy, any next steps to address climate change became even more 
dynamic with the change in Presidential administrations. 
Section II of this article examines the Obama Administration Clean 
Power Plan, its costs, and its legally disputed benefits.  The Supreme 
Court took the wholly unprecedented step to indefinitely stay this 
executive rule years before the legal challenge reached the Supreme 
Court or was decided by the court of appeals on the merits,14 whereafter 
the D.C. Circuit has repeatedly delayed the required decision on the 
merits for more than one year.15  The issue is now suspended in legal 
limbo. 
Section III examines what a Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commissioner called a “jurisdictional train wreck.”16  Section III tracks 
the impact of the 2017 change in Presidential administrations on legal 
interpretation, recent executive orders to implement a new view of 
executive power, and use of the Congressional Review Act regarding 
major recent domestic regulation.  Given the recent Supreme Court-
mandated economic cost considerations in agency rulemaking, Section 
III analyzes how a new Presidential administration can and has changed 
the administrative law algorithm through a narrower recalculation of: 
 Only domestic U.S. benefits of the Clean Power Plan, 
 Exclusion of any global benefits beyond the geographic footprint 
of America, and 
 Exclusion of “co-benefits” not regulated by the CPP 
Section IV analyzes in legal detail the fulcrum created  by three 
recent Supreme Court opinions changing the power of executive branch 
agencies to make law.  First, Section IV analyzes the still-pending 
litigation directly challenging the Clean Power Plan, triggering the 
highly unusual early Supreme Court indefinite stay years before the case 
reached it and before any court had reached a decision on the merits.17  
Next, Section IV analyzes the Supreme Court ruling that the executive 
branch cannot “tailor” statutory provisions to its preferences.18  Third, 
Section IV analyzes the Court decision mandating executive branch 
consideration of costs before initiating certain new regulation.19  
Together, these three decisions change the Chevron doctrine as applied 
 
 14. Erin Ryan, The Clean Power Plan, the Supreme Court’s Stay and Irreparable Harm, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 2016, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/erin-ryan/the-clean-
power-plan-the-_b_9259858.html. 
 15. See W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
 16. Garner, supra note 1. 
 17. See W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000. 
 18. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2445 (2014). 
 19. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
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to U.S. constitutional and administrative law, a change which former 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens called “truly mind-boggling 
. . .  a free-wheeling statutory decision can do even more harm . . . to the 
. . . Court itself—than misinterpretations of the Constitution.”20 
Section V examines what happens when adminstrations change and 
regulations are repealed or Court legal stays are extended.  Section V 
also documents how the Amercian system is resilient enough to find 
alternative legal routes to ends.  To date, even without the Supreme 
Court allowing the Clean Power Plan to proceed under the new 
administration, power sector carbon emissions are still on track to 
achieve the dramatic reduction required if the CPP were in place and not 
stayed or repealed.  Section VI takes the next step to examine technology 
by technology at a micro level how this is occurring with the law stayed, 
through larger forces at work.   
Section VII analyzes the long-term implications for constitutional 
and administrative U.S. law.  These decisions permanently limit 
discretion of an agency to tailor their implementation of a statute,21 inject 
mandatory new quantitative cost consideration even when not expressly 
required by statute,22 and indefinitely suspend executive branch 
regulations years before the Supreme Court gets the case merits to 
review.23  This trio of decisions recongfigures traditional Chevron 
deference, a foundation of American law for the last third of a century.24  
Powers of the executive branch are more restricted, and agencies have 
been stripped of some traditional discretion.  This is a significant 
restructuring of American law. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20. Former Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, Speech to ABA Meeting in 
Chicago (July 31, 2015), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_Speech_ABA_Section_of_Litigatio
n_International_Human_Rights_Award_Luncheon_07-31-15.pdf. 
 21. See generally UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. 
 22. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
 23. See W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000. 
 24. See Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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II. THE LEGAL MECHANISMS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN ENACTMENT 
AND/OR REPEAL 
The change in the foundation of administrative law separating the 
power of different branches of government is in even sharper relief 
because the underlying challenged law affects one of the most pressing 
issues of the century—climate change and global warming.  This 
involves both energy and environmental policy. Electric power 
production is the most significant source of CO2 emissions in the United 
States which contributes to climate change. 
Figure 125 
Initiatives during the Obama administration to regulate the 
environment focused on the electric power sector, on the use of coal 
resources on hazardous and climate changing emissions, and on 
mitigating climate change.  These initiatives required states to take the 
laboring hand by implementing choices to accomplish these policies, and 
included:   
 Joining with most other nations in the world in the 2015 Paris 
Accord.26 
 
 25. See EPA, TOTAL U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY ECONOMIC SECTOR IN 2014 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-
gas-emissions_.html. 
 26. See UNITED NATIONS, LIST OF PARTIES THAT SIGNED THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON 
22 APRIL, 
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/04/parisagreementsingatures/. 
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 Restricting power plant hazardous mercury emissions, since 
overturned and remanded by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. 
EPA.27 
 Restricting CO2 global warming emissions through the Clean 
Power Plan focused on coal-fired power plants, which has since 
been preliminarily enjoined by the Supreme Court in West 
Virginia v. EPA.28 
This article focuses on each of these prongs in which the Court 
changes administrative and constitutional law in the United States.  We 
start, with the Clean Power Plan. 
A. Federal CPP Standards; State Plans For Implementation 
1. The Administrative Rule 
The Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan was a foundational 
U.S. environmental regulatory action; it counted international benefits 
to meet Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement 2015 pledges to reduce 
carbon emissions.29  EPA Secretary Pruitt criticized the Paris Agreement 
as internationally imbalanced:  “China and India got away, the largest 
producers of CO2 internationally, got away scot-free. They didn’t have 
to take steps until 2030.  So we’ve penalized ourselves through lost jobs 
while China and India didn’t take steps to address the issue 
internationally.”30  When Syria joined the Paris Climate Accord in late 
2017, it left the United States as the only organized nation neither to have 
joined nor remained within the Accord.31   
The Clean Power Plan exclusively targeted fossil fuel electricity 
production for reductions of carbon.32 The Obama Administration’s 
October 2015 Clean Power Plan is a 460-page rule targeting CO2 
 
 27. See infra Section IV.C. 
 28. W. Va., 136 S. Ct. 1000; see infra Section II.A.2. 
 29. See infra Section III.C. As part of the Kyoto Protocol which affected only 
approximately three dozen developed countries and the more recent Paris Agreement which 
took the next international step of non-legally binding pledges of all countries to reduce 
warming emissions, countries pledged different amounts of reduction of their GHGs 
emissions from different year baselines and of different amounts. 
 30. Martin Pengelly, Trump to Sign Executive Order Undoing Obama’s Clean Power 
Plan, GUARDIAN, Mar. 26, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/mar/26/trump-executive-order-clean-
power-plan-coal-plants. 
 31. Brady Dennis, As Syria Embraces Paris Climate Deal, it’s the United States Against 
the World, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/07/as-syria-
embraces-paris-climate-deal-its-the-united-states-against-the-
world/?utm_term=.3f4d0b134644. 
 32. See infra notes 50, 55-56. 
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emissions from large power generation facilities33 in order to achieve a 
required thirty-two percent reduction of annual CO2 emissions from new 
and existing power plants34 by 2030, measured against a baseline of 2005 
carbon emission levels from that year’s power generation plants.35  In 
certain states, this would require up to a fifty percent cut in carbon 
intensity of existing electric power generation.36  EPA received 2.5 
million comments from environmental groups, regulated industry, the 
public, and states, in response to its proposed CPP regulation, under 
which, each state would be required to develop standards of performance 
to limit CO2 emissions from existing fossil-fuel-fired generating 
facilities.37   
The CPP requires state-differentiated plans to satisfy federally-
mandated state requirements.  It modifies parts of the Clean Air Act, 
which provides a comprehensive scheme for air pollution control, 
addressing three general categories of pollutants emitted from stationary 
sources: criteria pollutants, hazardous pollutants, and “pollutants that are 
(or may be) harmful to public health or welfare but are not [hazardous 
or criteria pollutants or] cannot be controlled under [those programs.]”38 
“Six relatively ubiquitous “criteria” pollutants are regulated under 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410”39:  oxides of nitrogen, sulfur dioxide, lead, carbon 
 
 33. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661–65,120, RIN 2060–AR33 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 34. EPA, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN OVERVIEW, 
http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-overview. Between the 
rule’s promulgation in 2014 and final rule issuance in 2015, the EPA delayed implementation. 
Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,665. This included more time for state compliance with a 
two-year delay for states filing required plans from 2016 to 2018, and a two-year delay in the 
first year of required CO2 reductions, from 2020 to 2022. Id. at 64,669. The EPA’s final 
regulation indicates that the goal of this rule is to substitute gas for coal in the generation of 
electricity. Id. at 64,667. The EPA increased how much CO2 emissions will have to be brought 
down from the 2005 baseline in the next fifteen years from the thirty percent proposed to 
thirty-two percent in the final rule. Id. at 64,665. 
 35. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. 64665 (Oct. 23, 2015); see also Juliet Eilperin & 
Steven Mufson, EPA Proposes Cutting Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal Plants 30% by 
2030, WASHINGTON POST (June 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/epa-to-propose-cutting-carbon-dioxide-emissions-from-coal-plants-30percent-by-
2030/2014/06/01/f5055d94-e9a8-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html. 
 36. Paul DeCotis, What the Clean Power Plan Means for You & How to Tackle Building 
a Compliance Strategy, ENERGY BIZ (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.energybiz.com/article/14/11/what-clean-power-plan-means-you-how-tackle-
building-compliance-strategy. 
 37. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED STANDARDS OF 
PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE HAS EMISSION FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: 
ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS at 1-1 (Sept. 2013), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-09/documents/20130920proposalria.pdf. 
 38. Final Brief for Respondents at 3, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 & 
No.12-1151 (Mar. 9, 2015). 
 39. Id. 
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monoxide, particulate matter, and ozone.40  “Once EPA issues air quality 
criteria for [these] pollutants, the Administrator of the Agency must 
propose primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for 
them at levels “requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate 
margin of safety.” “ 41  
Apart from criteria pollutants and under a separate section of the 
Act, “hazardous air pollutants” are regulated under 42 U.S.C. § 7412.42 
“EPA must publish and revise a list of “major” and “area” source 
categories of hazardous pollutants, and then has a nondiscretionary 
obligation to establish achievable emission standards for all listed 
hazardous air pollutants emitted by sources within a listed category.”43  
“The final major category of pollutants covered by the [Clean Air Act,] 
harmful pollutants not regulated under the NAAQS or hazardous 
pollutant programs are subject to regulation under 42 U.S.C. § 7411.”44   
“Section 7411 has two main components[:]  First, Section 7411(b) 
requires EPA to promulgate federal “standards of performance” 
addressing new stationary sources that cause or contribute significantly 
to “air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.” 45  “[S]ection 7411(d) authorizes EPA to promulgate 
regulations [that require] states to establish standards of performance for 
existing stationary sources of the same pollutant” “once EPA has set new 
source standards addressing emissions of a particular pollutant.”46  “If a 
state fails to submit a satisfactory plan, EPA is authorized to prescribe a 
plan for the state, and… enforce plans where states fail to do so.”47  
During the Obama Administration, EPA utilized the regulation of 
vehicle emissions as the legal initial step in order thereafter to regulate 
stationary power plant emissions.  Once any substance becomes a 
regulated pollutant (whether or not a criteria or toxic pollutant) under the 
Clean Air Act, other provisions expand that regulation.48  After the 
Massachusetts v. EPA decision four years before,49 the Act began to 
regulate greenhouse gasses for light-duty vehicles as mobile sources in 
 
 40. See EPA, Criteria Air Pollutants, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants; see 
also FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 189 exhibit 5.1, 191 exhibit 5.2. 
 41. See Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 42. Final Brief for Respondents at 3, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 & 
No.12-1151 (Mar. 9, 2015). 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Id. at 5. 
 45. See Murray, 788 F.3d 330. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See EPA, THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN A NUTSHELL: HOW IT WORKS 18 (Mar. 22, 2013) 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/caa_nutshell.pdf. 
 49. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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2011, four years after the Massachusetts v. EPA decision.50  In 2009, 
EPA issued a finding that six greenhouse gases cause or contribute to air 
pollution which endangers U.S. public health and welfare.51  The 
findings, alone, do not substantively impose any requirements on 
industry or other entities, but were a prerequisite to issue the CPP 
subsequently.52  However, the action was a prerequisite to finalizing 
EPA’s greenhouse gas emission standards for cars and light-duty trucks, 
which were jointly promulgated by EPA incorporating vehicle fuel 
economy standards from the Department of Transportation in 2010.53  
Beginning in 2011, these mobile standards triggered requirements for 
stationary sources of greenhouse gasses (GHGs).54  
In response to that trigger, there was a follow-on requirement that 
major new or modified stationary sources with greenhouse gas emissions 
automatically were subject to the Act’s New Source Review, which is 
an added layer for new or modified sources in areas not in attainment 
with the NAAQS to install a stricter Lowest Achievable Emission Rate 
(LAER) technology, purchase emission offsets, and other requirements 
to restrict emissions. Eighty-four separate cases challenged the rule.55  In 
2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied industry and 
state motions to stay the endangerment finding and related EPA 
regulations, sustaining the agency’s regulatory finding.56   
The “categorical” emission limitations are intended, by an “ample 
margin of safety,” to regulate pollutants that “may cause, or contribute 
to cause, an increase in mortality, or an increase in serious, irreversible, 
 
 50. See ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY STUDY INSTITUTE, FACT SHEET: TIMELINE OF 
EPA’S ACTIONS ON GREENHOUSE GASES, (Sept. 23,  2014), 
http://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-timeline-of-epa-actions-on-greenhouse-gases. 
 51. See id.; see also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse 
Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (those 
chemicals are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6)). EPA issued its finding in 
response to the 2007 Supreme Court decision in Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533 (2007), that 
required the agency to decide the issue. Id. at 66,499. 
 52. See EPA, GREENHOUSE GASES, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-
and-cause-or-contribute-findings-greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean. 
 53. Id.; See also Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-05-07/pdf/2010-8159.pdf. 
 54. See FACT SHEET, supra note 50. 
 55. Robin Bravender, 16 ‘Endangerment’ Lawsuits Filed Against EPA Before Deadline, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/17/17greenwire-16-
endangerment-lawsuits-filed-against-epa-bef-74640.html. 
 56. Coal. for Resp. Reg. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curium), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part; UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2013). 
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or incapacitating reversible illness.”57 As part of the CPP, EPA 
“proposed… performance standards for new power plants under Section 
[111(b) of the Clean Air Act,] standards for modified and reconstructed 
power plants under Section [111(b) of the Act,] and regulations under 
which states would submit plans to address CO2 emissions from existing 
power plants under section [111(d) of the Act.]”58  “Under Section 111 
of the Clean Air Act, EPA can only [set] standards for… existing sources 
and units if it has [already] set standards for… new [units] in the same 
category” or of the same type.59 
The Clean Air Act New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) 
under Section 111(d) require EPA to mandate that each exiting emission 
unit meeting the threshold size meet the Best System of Emission 
Reduction (BSER). For each state under EPA’s CPP that BSER is 
determined based on the mix of each state’s individual existing 
generating sources.60  In some states this would demand up to a fifty 
percent cut in carbon intensity generation, and in other states, much 
less.61  While the rule contained highly differentiated individualized CO2 
requirements for each state, each state was left to its own plan on how it 
would meet its quantitative power plant CO2 emission reduction 
requirement.62  EPA received more than a quarter million rulemaking 
comments in 2014 regarding the CPP proposed rule.63  The final rule 
increased how much CO2 emissions would have to be brought down 
nationwide from the 2005 baseline to 2030; from thirty percent to thirty-
two percent.64  There was a two-year delay for state required filing of 
state plans until 2018 with first actual reductions of CO2 delayed until 
2022.65 
To generate electricity in the United States, EPA’s final regulation 
set a goal to substitute natural gas for coal.66  EPA’s rule states that the 
“book life” of a coal plant is forty years, and that states in their 
 
 57. See U.S.C. §§ 7408-10. This statutory language, as upheld by the court in NRDC v. 
EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987), emphasizes that these standards are intended to protect 
the public health and welfare with no consideration for the practicalities involved in their 
implementation through law. 
 58. Final Brief for Respondents Environmental Protection Agency at 3, Murray Energy 
Corp. v. EPA, No. 14-1112 & No.12-1151 at 8 (Mar. 9, 2015). 
 59. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA REGULATIONS: TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON 
TRACK? R41561 at 20 (Dec. 30, 2016) [hereinafter TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?]. 
 60. EPA, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN OVERVIEW, 
https://archive.epa.gov/epa/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-overview-clean-power-plan.html. 
 61. See DeCotis, supra note 36. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See EPA, FACT SHEET: PROPOSED ACE  RULE, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-08/documents/ace_cost-benefit.pdf. 
 64. See DeCotis, supra note 36. 
 65. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Aug. 3, 2015). 
 66. Id. at 64,756. 
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compliance filings should consider not allowing operation of older coal 
plants under this rule.67  EPA utilized a planning assumption that states 
and regional independent system operators (ISOs) should take existing 
natural gas combustion turbines, which were running only at a national 
forty to fifty percent capacity factor compared to their full operation 
capabilities, and increase those facilities to an average seventy-five 
percent operating capacity factor to displace coal-fired power.68 This 
demonstrates that natural gas-fired combined cycle facilities can operate 
at ninety-one percent availability.69  
EPA’s final rule eliminated energy efficiency as one of four state 
compliance building blocks to reduce CO2 emission, retaining with 
improvement of coal-fired power facility heat rates, substitution of 
natural gas instead of coal electric facility operation, and construction of 
more renewable energy as state “building blocks” to comply with 
reduction requirements.70  For those states which refused to comply, 
Federal Implementation Plans (FIPs) can be imposed by EPA as 
mandatory elements for the states.71  
The EPA Clean Power Plan employs Section 111(d) of the Clean 
Air Act72 to regulate existing power generation sources that are not 
regulated under other sections of the Act.73  For new power plants, EPA 
also proposed new executive branch regulations for new CO2-emiting 
power plants under Section 111(b) of Clean Air Act.74  Best System of 
Emission Reduction applies technology standards to affected plants, and 
as proposed in the CPP, would effectively make impossible use of 
conventional coal-burning power technology for new plants.75  
Conventional coal-fired electric generation facilities will not be able to 
 
 67. Id. at 64,872. 
 68. Id. at 64,800. 
 69. Id. at 64,799-64,801. 
 70. Id. at 64,667. 
 71. Jeremy M. Tarr, The Clean Air Act and Power Sector Carbon Standards: Basics of 
Section 111(d), NICHOLAS INST. FOR ENVTL. POLICY SOLUTIONS, DUKE UNIVERSITY, tbl. 1 
(Sept. 2013), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/sites/default/files/publications/ni_pb_13-
03.pdf. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 73. Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, EPA (June 2, 2014) (providing general information 
on plan, factsheets, and press releases); see also Megan Ceronsky, Section 11(d) of the Clean 
Air Act—Cooperative Federalism and Performance-Based Standards, ENVTL. DEF. FUND 
BLOG (May 20, 2014), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2014/05/20/section-111d-of-the-
clean-air-act-cooperative-federalism-and-performance-based-standards/. 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b). 
 75. 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014). EPA previously proposed CO2 emission standards 
for new power plants in 2012 but withdrew the proposed rule after taking comment. See 77 
Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012) (proposal); 79 Fed. Reg. 1352 (Jan. 8, 2014) (withdrawing 
proposal). 
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meet the CPP specified level.76  The Clean Air Act’s NSPS must 
implement BSER, taking into account costs, environmental impact, and 
energy requirements.77  The proposed “New Source Rule” issued by 
EPA establishes separate performance standards for new coal-and gas-
fired power plants.78 
EPA determined that carbon capture and storage (“CCS”)79 was an 
“adequately demonstrated” technology that qualified as BSER for 
purposes of the CPP.80  Many consider this unproven in the United 
States.81  At the time of the rule’s promulgation, no operating U.S. plants 
used CCS to capture necessary amounts of pollution.82   
EPA established a regulatory threshold forty percent lower than 
current “best-in-class” coal turbine technologies for new coal-fired 
electric generating plants in the CPP.83 This is a level that current 
technology for new coal facilities could not meet.84  EPA concurred 
without regrets that no new U.S. coal-fired plants would be built between 
2015-2020 that could meet its new standards.85  The effect is that the 
CPP, by default, indirectly substitutes operation of natural gas and 
renewable energy generation for existing coal-fired power.86  EPA’s 
 
 76. Seth Hilton, The Impact of California’s Global Warming Legislation on the Electric 
Utility Industry, 19 ELECTRICITY J. 10 (2006). 
 77. See STEVEN FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS 196-97 
(Wolters Kluwer, 7th ed. 2016) (NSPS BSER requirement). 
 78. “New source” does not include existing sources undertaking modifications or 
reconstructions, and certain projects currently under development. 
 79. EPA ARCHIVE, https://archive.epa.gov/epa/sites/production/files/2016-
04/documents/cpp-presentation.pdf; see also EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64509 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 80. See EEA TECHNICAL REPORT, AIR POLLUTION IMPACTS FROM CARBON CAPTURE 
AND STORAGE (CCS), https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/carbon-capture-and-storage. 
Facilities deploying CCS technology can filter and capture CO2 from the emission waste 
stream and pump it into geologic formations or use it to extract coal-bed methane or oil in 
depleted or diminished oil reservoirs. EPA cites four projects currently under development 
that will deploy some type of CCS. 
 81. See American Geoscience Institute, Carbon Capture and Storage Debate Heats Up, 
https://www.americangeosciences.org/policy/news-briefs/carbon-capture-and-storage-
debate-heats. 
 82. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59. 
 83. See ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CAN FUTURE COAL POWER PLANTS 
MEET CO2 EMISSION STANDARDS WITHOUT CARBON CAPTURE & STORAGE?, (Oct. 2015), 
https://www.ieca-us.com/wp-content/uploads/EPRI_Can-Future-Coal-Power-Plants-Meet-
CO2-Emission-Standards-Without-Carbon-Capture-Storage_10.2015.pdf. 
 84. Id.; See 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,709; see also STEVEN FERREY, LAW OF 
INDEPENDENT POWER § 6:7.40 n.9 (Thomson Reuters, 45th ed. 2018). 
 85. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59. 
 86. The EPA utilizes a planning assumption that states an independent system operators 
(ISOs) should take natural gas combustion turbines, whose history demonstrates that they can 
operate at ninety-one percent availability but which are running only at a national forty to fifty 
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final CPP regulation reinforces that this rule substitutes natural gas for 
coal for the generation of electricity.87 
2. The Legal Challenge  
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Commissioner 
Tony Clark criticized the CPP injecting environmental factors into how 
power plants are allowed to run, predicting “a jurisdictional train wreck” 
resulting from the CPP under the Clean Air Act attempting to regulate 
carbon emissions.88  FERC Commissioner Philip Moeller testified that 
the Obama Administration carbon regulations were “an enforcement 
regime that would be awkward at best, and potentially very inefficient 
and expensive.”89  Commissioner Moeller testified that the CPP rules 
would cause “a shift from traditional [executive agency] economic 
dispatch to environmental dispatch.”90 The FERC commissioners 
“expressed skepticism with the EPA’s assumption that enough natural 
gas pipelines will be built over the next five to ten years to allow natural 
gas-fired generation to replace thousands of megawatts of retiring coal 
generation” as the main prong of the CPP.91 
Seventeen state attorneys general filed comments highlighting 
“numerous legal defects” and system reliability issues in EPA’s proposal 
to regulate power plant emissions under Section 111(d) of the Clean Air 
Act.92  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce characterized the Obama 
Administration EPA regulations as “a series of one-sided, politically-
charged regulations that are intended to take the place of legislation that 
cannot achieve a consensus in the Congress.”93  More than half the states 
thereafter sued EPA regarding its authority to issue these regulations.94  
The litigation on the CPP attacked its regulation of both existing 
and new coal-fired carbon-emitting power plants.  While the “marque” 
 
percent capacity factor and increase those to a seventy-five percent capacity factor to displace 
coal-fired power. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661, 64,799. 
 87. 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 88. Garner, supra note 1. 
 89. Id. Commissioner “Moeller stated that the biggest challenge in implementing the 
proposed rule is that electricity markets are interstate in nature,” while EPA has a state-by-
state approach for emissions reductions. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Herman Trabish, Comments are in on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan (the attorneys 
general of the 17 states that sued were from Oklahoma, West Virginia, Nebraska, Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, 
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming), UTILITY DIVE, 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/comments-are-in-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/338783/. 
 93. U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, REGULATORY AREAS, ENERGY, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT, http://www.uschamber.com/regulations/areas. 
 94. Trabish, supra note 92. 
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plaintiffs amongst the various lawsuits against EPA’s CPP were Murray 
Energy and the states of Texas and West Virginia, there were numerous 
other parties’ lawsuits that in 2016 were consolidated with challenges 
from twenty-eight states and more than 120 companies and 
organizations into one multi-party case, State of West Virginia, et al. v. 
EPA.95  This included more than half the states, as well as various 
industries and additional parties that filed petitions in the case.96  Parties 
supporting EPA included eighteen states plus sixty cities and towns 
participating as interveners.97  Twenty-seven states sued EPA on 
promulgation of the CPP rule,98 alleging a violation of the Clean Air 
Act.99 
There is no federal case law, nor any Environmental Protection 
Agency rules, which have, or can, resolve direct conflicts regarding how 
one counts environmental ‘benefits’ against the cost imposed on the 
operation of power generation units to reduce polluting operation.100  
The closest precedent is provocative Supreme Court dicta from forty 
years ago in Union Electric,101 wherein the Court held that an owner of 
a fossil fuel-fired power generation facility can always “shut down its 
plant and curtail electric service” to meet any imposed environmental 
requirements. 102   
 
 95. COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, CHALLENGING THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, 
https://cei.org/litigation/challenging-clean-power-plan-cei-et-al-v-epa. 
 96. Additional parties included: Oklahoma, North Dakota, Int’l Brotherhood of 
Boilermakers, Murray Energy Corp., NMA, ACCCE, UARG/APPA, Alabama Power Co. et 
al, CO2 Task Force of the Fla. Elect. Power Coordinating Grp., Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 
Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass’n., United Mine Workers, NRECA et al., Westar 
Energy, NorthWestern Corp., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, Chamber of Commerce et al., 
Ass’n of Am. Railroads, Mississippi DEQ, Luminant Generation Co., Basin Electric Power 
Coop., Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Energy & Env’t Legal Inst., Entergy Corp., 
LG&E/KU, West Virginia Coal Ass’n, Newmont Nevada Energy Inv./Newmont USA, 
Kansas City Bd. of Pub. Utils., North Am. Coal Corp., Indiana Util. Grp., Louisiana Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n, Genon Mid-Atlantic et al., Prairie State Generating Co., Minnesota Power, 
Denbury Onshore, Energy-Intensive Mfrs.’ Working Grp. on Greenhouse Gas Reg., Nat’l All. 
of Forest Owners, Biogenic CO2 Coal., Local Gov’t Coal. for Renewable Energy, Am. Forest 
& Paper Ass’n/Am. Wood Council, Competitive Enter. Inst. et al. 
 97. These included: California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, Vermont, and Washington), sixty municipalities 
from twenty-eight different states, with a total population of thirty-three million, companies 
including Amazon, Apple, Google, and Microsoft, the Am. Wind Energy Ass’n & Solar 
Energy Indus. Ass’n, 208 Members of Cong. (157 Representatives; thirty-six Senators; fifteen 
former members). 
 98. Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330, 331-32 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 100. Steven Ferrey, Broken at Both Ends: The Need to Reconnect Energy and 
Environment, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 54, 56-58 (2015). 
 101. Union Elec. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). 
 102. See id. 
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In its 2009 Riverkeeper decision,103 involving the entrainment of 
aquatic species on power plant cooling water intake structures, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress, in Clean Water Act Section 316(b), 
did not categorically forbid EPA from comparing costs to benefits when 
determining what is the best technology available for minimizing 
adverse environmental impacts of power plant cooling water intake 
structures.104  EPA was left the authority to decide not to engage in such 
analysis.105 Congressional testimony in 2014 by FERC Commissioner 
Clark characterized the conflict between proposed environmental 
regulation in the CPP to assist climate goals and the pressing counter 
requirement to protect power system reliability and resiliency to be “a 
jurisdictional train wreck.”106   
When the CPP regulation was proposed in 2015, Senator Mitch 
McConnell sent a letter to the National Governors Association urging 
states to not submit required plans complying with those regulations 
once they were promulgated.107  When the proposed CPP rule was 
initially challenged at the stage of the proposed regulation, the issue of 
final agency action went to the federal circuit court.  The federal D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals held that only final agency action is subject to 
judicial review:108  
Proposed rules meet neither of the two requirements for final agency 
action: (i) They are not the “consummation of the agency’s decision-
making process,” and (ii) they do not determine “rights or 
obligations,” or impose “legal consequences.”109 
 
 103. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009). It did not require EPA to employ 
cost-benefit analysis, however EPA must provide a reasoned explanation if it should choose 
to regulate in a way that would do more harm than good or provide a reasoned explanation 
why the agency is indifferent to that outcome. See id. 
 104. Id. at 223. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Garner, supra note 1. 
 107. Letter from Senator Mitch McConnell to National Governors Association (Mar. 19, 
2015), 
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=newsletters&ContentRecord_id=d57e
ba06-0718-4a22-8f59-1e610793a2a3&ContentType_id=9b9b3f28-5479-468a-a86b-
10c747f4ead7&Group_id=2085dee5-c311-4812-8bea-2dad42782cd4. 
 108. Murray, 788 F.3d 304. Murray argued that their business would be negatively 
affected by the plan, and they had incurred costs in anticipation of the final rulemaking. Id. at 
335. 
 109. Id. at 334-35. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Am. Portland Cement All. v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“a proposed regulation is still in flux,” so “review is premature”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Action on Smoking & Health v. Dep’t of Lab., 28 F.3d 162, 165 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (“Agency action is final when it imposes an obligation, denies a right, or fixes some 
legal relationship,” and an agency’s “proposed rulemaking generates no such consequences.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Consequently, the initial complaint in In re Murray Energy 
Corporation was dismissed in June 2015 by the D.C. Circuit because the 
EPA rule was not final at that time and administration remedies had not 
yet been exhausted, and thus the court lacked the authority to rule on its 
legality.110  On the challenge to the final regulation, the Obama 
Administration raised procedural defenses to attempt to avoid a decision 
on the merits.  EPA argued that complainant Murray lacked Article III 
standing because Murray was unable to show an individualized injury 
from the proposed rule.111  To establish Article III standing, an injury 
must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable 
to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.112  
A petitioner who asserts standing based on the expectation of future 
injury confronts a more rigorous burden to establish standing.113  Based 
on previous case law, EPA stated that additionally, when the petitioner 
is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he 
challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily more difficult 
to establish.114  EPA stated that the Court had long held that an 
administrative agency’s initiation of rulemaking through a notice and 
comment process did not impair the rights of interested parties, so as to 
give rise to Article III standing, even if such parties would have been 
directly regulated by a final rule.115 
EPA also argued that any Murray injury was speculative and did 
not confer standing.  EPA stated that Murray’s claim was too speculative 
to support standing because it was based on predicting the substantive 
content of one possible outcome of the rulemaking.116  EPA argued that 
the Article III standing cases Murray relied on involved challenges to 
final rules promulgated after notice and comment, not proposed rules 
published for the purpose of soliciting public comments, or to agency 
directives that were not subject to notice-and-comment.117 
 
 110. Id. at 334 (“[A] proposed rule is just a proposal. In justiciable cases, this Court has 
the authority to review the legality of final agency rules. We do not have authority to review 
proposed agency rules.”). 
 111. Appellate Brief at 9, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (2015) (Nos. 14-
1112, 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022486. 
 112. Id. at 10; Murray, 788 F.3d 330. 
 113. Appellate Brief at 10-11, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, 788 F.3d 330 (2015) (Nos. 
14-1112, 14-1151), 2015 WL 1022486. 
 114. Id. at 11. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 12. The EPA stated that at that point in time, when EPA was still evaluating 
and had not yet responded to the millions of comments it received, any predictions about what 
state specific guidelines EPA might have adopted in a final rule, let alone what requirements 
each state, in turn, independently may impose on power plants pursuant to such guidelines, 
were pure conjecture. Id. at 13. 
 117. Id. 
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B. The Congressional Review Act  
Aside from judicial challenge, there is a revisionary option for the 
Congress.  The Congressional Review Act (CRA)118 created in the 
Congress the discretion and legal ability to unwind recent regulatory 
orders or rules.  A recent example of this is the Trump Administration 
and Congress’ attempts to undo critical accomplishments from the last 
months of the Obama administration.119  After a major rule is published 
in the Federal Register, it takes effect sixty days later.120  Congress can 
disapprove a rule through a joint resolution under the Congressional 
Review Act, retroactive to the date the rule became effective.121 
The Congressional Review Act allows Congress to amend or 
disapprove proposed agency actions by passing a joint resolution after 
the executive action becoming final.122 It has almost never been used, as 
it would require disapproval by both houses of Congress and either the 
signature of the President or an override of a veto by two-thirds of both 
houses.123  If a rule proposed by one political administration is rescinded 
by the subsequently elected political administration, there must be a 
justification why such rescission is not arbitrary or capricious or an abuse 
of discretion.124  
Before any rule covered by the CRA can take effect, the federal 
agency that promulgates the rule must submit it to both houses of 
Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).  If 
Congress passes a joint resolution disapproving the rule under 
 
 118. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 801. The Congressional Review Act was 
created as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act in 1996, 5 U.S.C. 
8. It creates an automatic stay for sixty days for congressional review. Id. If disapproved by 
both houses of Congress and signed by the President or approved by the Congress over the 
President’s veto, the rule is null and void and there is a prohibition of issuing a similar rule. 
Id. Until recently, it had only successfully employed once since enacted in 1996, pertaining 
to a Clinton Administration OSHA rule in 2000, overturned during the subsequent Bush 
Administration. Id. 
 119. See Lauren Stephenson, The Little-Known Law Letting Trump Repeal Obama’s 
Regulations, NEWSY, Apr. 5, 2017, http://www.newsy.com/stories/trump-uses-
congressional-review-act-to-repeal-regulations/. Through the CRA, Trump signed eleven 
resolutions to repeal prior administration regulations in his first 100 days. President Donald 
Trump signed more than a dozen resolutions to overturn rules issued in the last half of 2016 
using the Congressional Review Act, an historic number for any president but affecting only 
a tiny fraction of the regulations. 
 120. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A). 
 121. 5 U.S.C. § 801(f). 
 122. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808. 
 123. Stuart Shapiro, The Congressional Review Act, Rarely Used and (Almost Always) 
Unsuccessful, THE HILL, Apr. 17, 2015, http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/lawmaker-
news/239189-the-congressional-review-act-rarely-used-and-almost-always. 
 124. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-42 
(1983). 
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procedures provided by the CRA, and it becomes law, the rule cannot 
take effect or continue in effect.125  The agency may not reissue either 
that rule or any substantially similar one, except under authority of a 
subsequently enacted law.126  
Procedurally, the CRA protects discretion of Congress.  A CRA 
motion to consider a disapproval resolution is not debatable and thus it 
cannot be filibustered by a minority of Senators.127  Once the Senate 
considers the CRA disapproval resolution, the expedited procedure 
incorporated in the CRA protects the ability of the Senate to continue 
and complete its action, with debate limited to ten hours without any 
amendments.128 
The CRA does not give Congress any extra authority. Indeed, 
Congress can pass legislation whenever it wants to repeal existing 
regulations, since those regulations are themselves derivative of earlier 
congressional enactments.  Instead, what the CRA does is—for a limited 
time—suspend much of the deliberative process, including committee 
consideration, conference committees to resolve differences between the 
two chambers’ respective legislation, and one procedural chokepoint—
the Senate filibuster.  A complex “carryover” provision in the CRA 
grants it even more reach. This provision enables a new session of 
Congress to reach back into the preceding presidential administration’s 
term so that it can apply the CRA’s expedited legislative procedures to 
rules that were finalized in the last several months of that 
administration.129 
The CRA creates an accessible legislative tool, valid for a discrete 
period, suspending much of the deliberative process otherwise necessary 
by the first branch of government to undo a unilateral executive branch 
regulation—including committee consideration, conference committees 
to resolve differences in decisions between the two legislative chambers’ 
 
 125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801(f), 802(d). 
 126. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). For the resolution to become law, the President must sign it or 
allow it to become law without his signature. Congress must override a presidential veto. See 
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS, 
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf. 
 127. 5 U.S.C. § 802(d)(4); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 128. See PAUL LARKIN, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE 
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT, Mar. 9, 2017, https://www.heritage.org/the-
constitution/report/judicial-review-under-the-congressional-review-act. This ensures that the 
Senate CRA disapproval resolution will remain substantively identical to the House joint 
resolution disapproving the same rule, so that no filibuster is possible on the resolution itself. 
Once a motion to proceed is adopted, the CRA resolution becomes “the unfinished business 
of the Senate until disposed of,” and a non-debatable motion may be offered to limit the time 
for debate. The CRA provides that at the conclusion of debate, the Senate automatically 
proceeds to vote on the resolution. Id. 
 129. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B). 
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regarding action on legislation, as well as the procedural ‘chokepoint’ of 
the Senate filibuster.  If a rule is challenged in court, the executive branch 
can postpone the effective date of a rule.130  A  postponement by the 
executive branch for an indefinite period has effect similar to a new rule 
revoking the regulation, which must be  done in compliance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.131  If a rule proposed by one political 
administration is rescinded by the subsequent political administration, 
there must be a justification why such rescission is not arbitrary or 
capricious or an abuse of discretion.132  The CRA enables a new session 
of Congress to “reach back” into the preceding presidential 
administration’s term so that it can apply the CRA’s expedited 
legislative procedures to negate rules that were finalized in the last 
several months of that prior presidential administration.133  So the CRA 
function as an expedited tool that allows the first branch of government 
to go down its checklist of recently passed regulations and negate on an 
expedited, stream-lined basis those of which it disapproves. 
There is history to the Congressional Review Act and the CPP.  In 
the 111th Congress, on December 15, 2009, four identical resolutions 
were introduced to disapprove the first of EPA’s GHG rules, the 
Endangerment Finding for carbon emissions, which was the necessary 
first step to justify regulating CO2 and other carbon emissions as a new 
category of pollutants that otherwise are not regulated by the Clean Air 
Act.134  Of the four, one proceeded to a vote:135 on June 10, 2010, the 
Senate voted forty-seven to fifty-three not to take up the resolution.136 
The CRA applies to a “rule.”137  There is no distinction in the CRA 
between proposed and final rules.138  Senator McConnell argued that it 
 
 130. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 705. 
 131. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, 
at 48. 
 132. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-
42 (1983).  
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 801(d)(1)(B). 
 134. One of these was in the Senate, S. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); three were in the 
House, H.R. Res. 66, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. Res. 76, 111th Cong. (2009); and H.R. Res. 
77, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 135. S. Res. 26. 
 136. See P.L. 107-5 (2001), 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261 (disapproving an OSHA rule on 
ergonomics). A motion to disapprove a resolution under the CRA is treated as not debatable, 
and it is not subject to delay by filibuster. The CRA does not allow amendments to it, and 
limits debate on it to ten hours. See RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 
DISAPPROVAL OF REGULATIONS BY CONGRESS: PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONGRESSIONAL 
REVIEW ACT, (Oct. 10, 2001), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/316e2dc1-fc69-43cc-979a-
dfc24d784c08.pdf.   
 137. Rules adopt the meaning contained in 5 U.S.C. § 804(3). 
 138. Section 551 does not directly address the definition of a proposed rule or the 
difference between a proposed and final rule, stating that a rule is “the whole or part of an 
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should also apply to proposed rules.139  Until the current Congress, the 
CRA was only invoked twice in its two decades.140 There is no case law 
examining the applicability of the CRA to proposed rules. S.J. Res. 30 
was introduced in 2017 with dozens of cosponsors; it disapproved of the 
EPA’s CPP proposed rule regarding New Source Performance Standards 
for electric generating units that had been published by the Obama 
Administration in the Federal Register in 2014141 
Proposed in Congress in 2016, and reintroduced in 2017, was the 
Separation of Powers Restoration Act to address unbalanced power 
favoring the executive branch; it authorizes courts reviewing agency 
actions to decide de novo all relevant questions of law, including the 
interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions and rules made 
by agencies.142  This would change the jurisprudence of administrative 
law in the United States.  It requires no deference to the agency’s 
interpretation regarding all relevant questions of law, thus eliminating 
Chevron and Auer,143 referred to as Auer deference in judicial review.144 
Introduced in the Congress in 2017 with bipartisan sponsorship in 
the U.S. Senate is the Regulatory Accountability Act, which would 
require agency regulations to have criteria for cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness applied as a prerequisite to promulgation.145  These 
 
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551. There also is no case 
precedent examining the applicability of the CRA to proposed rules. § 805 of the CRA 
prohibits judicial review of determinations, findings, actions, or omissions under the act. 5 
U.S.C. § 805. Section 802 specifies that the CRA is “an exercise of the rulemaking power of 
the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the 
rules of each House.” 5 U.S.C. § 802. When requested by members of Congress, the 
applicability of the CRA is conducted by GAO, which is required under Section 801 of the 
CRA to submit a report on each major rule to the committees of jurisdiction in the House and 
Senate. 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(2)(A). 
 139. Letter of Senator Mitch McConnell to Hon. Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of 
the United States (Jan. 16, 2014) http://4cleanair.org/Documents/McConnell-Letter-%20to-
GAO-1-16-14.pdf. 
 140. See 65 Fed. Reg. 68,261, P.L. 107-5 (2001) (disapproving of an Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration Rule regarding ergonomics). 
 141. EPA, Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 1430 (Jan. 8, 2014). 
 142. H.R. 76. 
 143. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1977) (Supreme Court deferred to agency 
interpretation of its own existing regulation if the regulation is ambiguous and the 
interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation, and when initially 
provided to court in a brief). There has been subsequent criticism of Auer deference. See Perez 
v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct 1199, 1212 (2015); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. 
Co. 564 U.S. 50, 59 (2011); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 
(2012). 
 144. See infra Section IV.B. 
 145. S. Res. 951, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). 
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changes have a “pervasive focus on costs.”146  Under the bill, agencies 
would be required to select the best regulatory choice measured by the 
monetary analysis based on the best available data.147  Quasi-
independent agencies are brought under these limitations:  U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) jurisdiction would extend to the 
regulations of the independent quasi-judicial agencies, such as FERC.  
Any or all of this would affect executive branch environmental and 
energy regulation, going forward. 
III. EXECUTIVE BRANCH REGULATION: TRANSITION AND REPEAL 
A. Transition in Administrations 
CPP allows state plans, which have not yet been submitted to EPA 
for the 2028 deadline, to administer CO2 controls “beyond the fence 
line”148 of each affected project’s deeded metes and bounds.149  There 
was a change in such off-site compliance mechanisms with the change 
of administrations.  The Trump Administration in the fall of 2017 
declared that the CPP was not permissible because the Clean Air Act 
requires individual source regulation, rather than regulation “beyond the 
fence line” or off-site and away from the emitting pollution source that 
is subject to Clean Air Act regulation.150  In other words, individual 
source controls must be administered, rather than a generic command to 
states to find any way they want to reduce carbon emissions. 
Of the three “building blocks” available under the CPP for states to 
meet the carbon emission standards, the Trump Administration’s has 
emphasized that inside-the-fence measures must be implemented at each 
 
 146. See FED’N OF AM. SCIS., EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN AND LIKELY LEGAL 
Challenges (Aug. 11, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/epa-clean.pdf; see also William 
Buzbee, Regulatory ‘Reform’ that is Anything But, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/15/opinion/regulatory-reform-bills-congress-
trump.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-
region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_r=1. 
 147. See Buzbee, supra note 146. 
 148. “Inside the fence” is used to describe pollution control applied to the emission source 
itself, such as on the power generation source in its combustion processes or immediate 
capture or neutralization of regulated emissions. “Outside the fence” is used to describe 
pollution control away from the regulated pollution source, the credits associated with which 
are applied or purchased to offset on paper the pollutants emitted by the pollution sources. 
This latter mechanism allows pollution credit trading and creates more options for minimizing 
emissions. 
 149. Buzbee, supra note 146. 
 150. See infra Section III.B. 
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power plant emissions source.151 According to the Trump 
Administration, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act does not allow 
outside-the-fence measures which target other than application of BSER 
to the emitting sources that are regulated.152  Such an emphasis on inside-
the-fence measures effectively discards two of the three CPP building 
blocks of the Obama Administration CPP:  Dispatching and running gas-
fired power plants in lieu of operating coal-fired plants which were 
directly CPP-targeted, and shifting generation to wind and solar 
plants.153  Incentives for renewable or other technologies do not limit the 
actual emissions output of the specifically regulated fossil generation 
sources that the Clean Air Act regulates. 
Quite apart from the pending, and now long-ongoing, legal 
challenges which predated the 2016 Presidential election, the change 
from the Obama to the Trump Administrations placed the CPP at non-
judicial risk.  Regulations enacted by one executive branch can be 
repealed by the next executive branch.  EPA promulgated regulations in 
2017 to change the value of saving emissions of CO2.154  Executive Order 
13783 issued on March 28, 2017, directed EPA to eliminate the CPP.155  
Prior to that, the Executive Order 13371 issued on January 30, 2017 
directed agencies to eliminate two existing regulations for every one new 
regulation issued.156  A lawsuit by the environmental organization 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) alleges that the new Order 
exceeds the President’s constitutional authority, violating his duty under 
 
 151. EPA, ANPR to Replace Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 61,507 at 61,512 (Dec. 28, 
2017) (Emphasis of application at or to an existing power plant at the regulated source, based 
on a physical or operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation at that 
source). 
 152. Id. at 61,511. 
 153. Id. at 61,516. 
 154. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 at 48,037 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/10/16/2017-22349/repeal-of-carbon-
pollution-emission-guidelines-for-existing-stationary-sources-electric-
utility?link_id=19&can_id=c66b4c63149f2740dbf1f9b5fe4fed84&source=email-weekly-
actions-5-ways-to-protect-what-matters-to-you-
most&email_referrer=&email_subject=weekly-actions-5-ways-to-protect-what-matters-to-
you-most.  “This approach shifts the focus to the domestic (rather than global) social cost of 
carbon, and employs both 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates.” Id. at 48,043.   
 155. Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 3-
5 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
 156. Exec. Order No. 13,771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, at 
42,751. Executive Order 13771 directs that no agency may issue a new rule unless the agency 
offsets the costs of the new rule by rescinding at least two existing ones. 
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the “Take Care” Clause of the Constitution,157 and directs federal 
agencies to engage in unlawful actions.158 
Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, EPA is legally 
bound to issue a new, separate, proposed rule any time it wishes to 
change or repeal any prior EPA regulation.159  Moreover, the wholesale 
removal of a regulation may constitute a “major Federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,” thereby 
triggering the need for an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) under 
the National Environmental Policy Act.160  Federal circuit courts of 
appeal have required on changing regulations: 
Changes in course * * * cannot be solely a matter of political winds 
and currents. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the 
pivot from one administration’s priorities to those of the next be 
accomplished with at least some fidelity to law and legal process.  
Otherwise, government becomes a matter of the whim and caprice 
of the bureaucracy, and regulated entities will have no assurance that 
business planning predicated on today’s rules will not be arbitrarily 
upset tomorrow.161  
In November 2017, the Trump Administration announced a repeal 
of the CPP.162  In the last few days of 2017, EPA issued an Advanced 
Notice of a Proposed Rulemaking to Replace the Clean Power Plan.163  
The Regulatory Impact Analysis (“RIA”) that will accompany the final 
repeal when published in 2018, is itself not generally challengeable as to 
its costs, benefits, and conclusions, because RIAs are not required by 
statute, but only by executive order.164  However, the challengers’ 
argument in the long-pending litigation against the CPP before the D.C. 
 
 157. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 158. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Donald Trump, Civil Action No. 17-253 (RDM) (D.D.C. 2017). 
 159. 5 U.S.C. § 551; see ABA, RULEMAKING SECTION 553 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT, 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/administrative_law/2011/11/2011_fall
_administrativelawconference/rulemaking_chapter_2011.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 160. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C); see EPA, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY REVIEW 
PROCESS, https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process. 
 161. N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. UFW, 703 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wilkinson, J., 
concurring). 
 162. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787 (Nov. 8, 2017). 
 163. EPA, supra note 151, at 61,507 (To utilize the best system of emission reduction 
(BSER) at or to an existing power plant, at the source-specific level, based on a physical or 
operational change to a building, structure, facility, or installation.) Id. at 61,512. 
 164. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 
(Jan. 13, 2017) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-
4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. 
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Circuit claimed alleged flaws in the original Obama Administration EPA 
RIA165 
B. The Legal Basis of Regulatory Repeal 
The Trump Administration EPA in 2017 switched gears and based 
its proposed repeal of the CPP not on a change in policy goals, nor on 
any of the critical cost considerations, which under the recent Supreme 
Court decision in Michigan, could be a basis for reconsideration.166  
Rather, EPA in 2017 initiated its still in-progress regulatory repeal of the 
CPP based on a legal concern that the Clean Power Plan violated the 
Clean Air Act by regulating “outside the fence line” of individual power 
plant sources that are subject to the Clean Air Act.167  In taking this step 
to resolve its perceived violation, EPA did not repeal its 2009 Clean Air 
Act “Endangerment” finding related to greenhouse gases which requires 
EPA to regulate CO2 emissions from the power sector consistent with 
the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration “Best 
System for Emissions Reductions.”168  The Endangerment Finding found 
that GHGs endanger public health and welfare, and GHGs from mobile 
sources, in the form of motor vehicle engine emissions, contribute to that 
endangerment.169 
There are options to repeal or to repeal and replace the CPP.  If the 
Trump Administration EPA does pursue a CPP replacement rule as part 
of a “repeal and replace” operation, it would almost certainly focus on a 
substitution of conventional inside-the-fence-line measures related to the 
power plant subject to NSPS regulation to control CO2 from existing 
power plants.  Such future inside-the-fence measures would likely focus 
on carbon reductions from the actual coal-fired boilers that turn their 
electricity generators.  This could include upgrading the efficiency of 
existing coal-plant boilers to reduce CO2 and other pollutants emitted per 
unit of power produced.  Previous Obama Administration EPA analyses 
found that such upgrades to the efficiency would lead to a roughly four 
 
 165. EPA, FACT SHEET: PROPOSAL TO REPEAL THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposed-repeal-cpp-
final_oct10.pdf. 
 166. See infra Section IV.C. 
 167. EPA, EPA TAKES ANOTHER STEP TO ADVANCE PRESIDENT TRUMP’S AMERICA 
FIRST STRATEGY, PROPOSES REPEAL OF CLEAN POWER PLAN, 2 (Oct. 10, 2017) 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-takes-another-step-advance-president-trumps-
america-first-strategy-proposes-repeal. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See EPA, ENDANGERMENT AND CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE SECTION 202(A) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/endangerment-and-cause-or-contribute-findings-
greenhouse-gases-under-section-202a-clean. 
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percent increase in efficiency at coal plants.170  This is in contrast to the 
Obama Administration CPP, which encouraged states to undertake 
measures outside the power plant fence line that did not affect existing 
regulated power plants inside-the-fence. 
Estimation of costs and benefits is discretionary in setting dollar 
values and is widely varying and controversial depending on the 
agency’s assumptions and estimations.  Of note, cost considerations still 
are front and center in the evolving legal battle. Various provisions of 
the Clean Air Act require EPA to weigh both costs and benefits of 
regulations.  For example, Section 111 directs EPA to establish 
performance standards for sources of air pollution that reflect the “best 
system” of pollution reduction, “taking into account the cost” of 
achieving the standard.171  The CPP would have had its costs exceeding 
direct benefits if the Obama Administration EPA had not counted in its 
assessment of costs and benefits:172  
 “Co-benefits” which the CPP did not expressly or directly 
regulate173 
 The large amount of assumed international benefits over which the 
Clean Air Act has no extraterritorial jurisdiction 
 Assumed and counted energy efficiency benefits after the Obama 
Administration final CPP rule explicitly dropped them from the 
proposed CPP rule as one of four allowed “building blocks” for 
state compliance with the CPP GHG reductions 
Looking at each of these three issues regarding what benefits are 
properly counted in executive rulemaking, the Obama Administration 
EPA justified a positive economic balance of the Clean Power Plan 
based on counting what have now become challenged benefits. These 
included the immediate respiratory health improvements from the “co-
benefits” of reduction of criteria pollutant lung irritants along with 
unrelated energy efficiency assumptions, and counting international 
extraterritorial economic benefits of mitigating climate change.174  The 
 
 170. Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, EPA Announces Repeal of Major Obama-Era Carbon 
Emissions Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2017. 
 171. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
 172. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661 (Oct. 23, 2015). See also 
Congressional Research Service, EPA Regulations: Too Much, Too Little, or On Track?, CRS 
Report R41561 Dec., 30, 2016, at 13. 
 173. See supra Section III.D. 
 174. See Alejandro Davila Fragoso, Harvard Study Finds $38 Billion Economic Benefit 
from EPA’s Carbon Rule, THINK PROGRESS, at 4 (June 9, 2016) 
https://thinkprogress.org/harvard-study-finds-38-billion-economic-benefit-from-epas-
carbon-rule-5448fc324979/. “Research has repeatedly shown that improved air quality is 
associated with health benefits such as fewer premature deaths, heart attacks, and 
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Obama Administration CPP cost-benefit analysis treated the cost savings 
arising from promoting energy efficiency, later expressly dropped by the 
Obama Administration from the rule’s final promulgation, as a reduction 
of the economic costs of the rule.175 This action offsets the increased cost 
associated with more use of renewable energy encouraged by the Plan.176  
The “benefit” side of cost-benefit analysis places an estimated dollar 
value on non-marketable “public” benefits, including human life, health, 
and well-being, aesthetics, recreation, and ecosystem integrity.177  
The Obama Administration EPA had previously estimated 
substantial benefits resulting from the CPP, including fourteen to thirty-
four billion dollars in benefits accruing just to health, monetizing the 
benefits each year of an estimated 3,600 premature deaths, 1,700 heart 
attacks, 90,000 asthma attacks, and of 300,000 lost work and school 
days.178 EPA estimated the CPP costs at 5.1-8.4 billion dollars per 
year.179  The benefits (counting all “co-benefits” and international as 
well as domestic benefits from carbon and other controversial and 
contested “co-benefit” pollutant reduction) were estimated at thirty-two 
to fifty-four billion dollars per year.180  
The change in administrations altered cost-benefit calculations.  
According to the Trump Administration EPA, the repeal of the CPP is 
estimated to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided compliance costs 
in 2030.181  To justify repealing the Clean Power Plan, the Trump 
Administration EPA changed the method of assessing costs and benefits.   
 
 
hospitalizations from respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses.” Id. According to this study, 
approximately 3,500 lives could be saved annually with a power plan carbon standard. Id. 
 175. See Elisabeth Gilmore, On Balance: Teachable Moments in Benefit-Cost Analysis: 
From Obama to Trump, SOCIETY OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://benefitcostanalysis.org/balance-teachable-moments-benefit-cost-analysis-obama-
trump. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Nathan Hultman, Trump’s Executive Order on Energy Independence, BROOKINGS 
INST., Mar. 28, 2017, at 2-3; see AMERICAN LUNG ASS’N, AMERICAN LUNG ASSOCIATION 
PLEDGES TO FIGHT TRUMP ADMINISTRATION ASSAULT ON CLEAN AIR AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.lung.org/about-us/media/press-releases/american-
lung-association-pledges-to-fight-trump-assault-on-clean-air.html; see also supra notes 74, 
76. 
 179. See supra note 172. See also, CRS December 2016, supra note 172, at 13. 
 180. See supra note 172. See also, CRS December 2016, supra note 172, at 13. Other 
reporters reported EPA’s calculated benefits as fourteen to thirty-four billion dollars per year; 
Hultman, supra note 178. In essence, the EPA set the BSER as different for each state. BSER 
is set considering cost. The cost and possibilities for each state would be different depending 
on its electric generating technology mix, and estimated time until retirement of each. 
Traditionally, the BSER was set as the same for each emitting technology or source.   
 181. See Gilmore, supra note 175. 
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In 2017, EPA no longer counted: 
 Climate change mitigation benefits occurring outside the United 
States over which EPA has no legal jurisdiction and which the 
CPP does not address 
 Indirect “co-benefits” that the Plan does not address 
 Estimates of avoided generation costs of the Clean Power Plan182  
C. The Legal Dimensions of International ‘Benefit’  
One needs to address the significance of international borders, 
when U.S. law does not extend beyond its borders, but when the benefits 
of reduced carbon emissions on warming are international.  When all 
costs are domestic, and benefits are international, what is the most 
appropriate comparison of costs and benefits?  First, as to the territorial 
issue, these changed assumptions and calculations in 2017 reduce the 
assumed CPP climate-change benefits from the Obama EPA prior 20 
billion dollars estimate of international benefits, to 3 billion dollars of 
benefits only measured within the U.S.183  Thus, eighty-five percent of 
the CPP Clean Air Act benefits were counted outside U.S. territory in 
which the Clean Air Act exercises jurisdiction. These eighty-five percent 
international versus fifteen percent national benefit values are very 
controversial regarding what is the proper methodology for the U.S. CPP 
calculation. 
Environmentalists have argued that international benefits should be 
counted in regulatory evaluation.184  They note that carbon reduction 
benefits everyone globally, which otherwise would be plagued by 
greater warming.185 Some claim that these benefits should be recognized 
and counted if they are realized.186 According to then-current EPA 
Administrator Scott Pruitt, the proposed repeal is being conducted in a 
 
 182. See Ted Gayer, The Social Costs of Carbon, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 28, 2017) 
https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/the-social-costs-of-carbon/. Instead of considering 
global climate benefits, the Trump administration EPA now only shows domestic benefits. 
 183. Lorraine Chow, Trump EPA ‘Cooks the Books’ to Hide Benefits of Clean Power 
Plan, ECOWATCH, Oct. 11, 2017, https://www.ecowatch.com/epa-clean-power-plan-
2495501894.html; see EPA, FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN BENEFITS OF A CLEANER, 
MORE EFFICIENT POWER SECTOR, 
https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/fact-sheet-clean-power-plan-
benefits-cleaner-more-efficient-power-sector_.html. 
 184. Emily Holden, EPA’s Climate Rule Withdrawal Will Include Big Changes to Cost 
Calculations, POLITICO, Oct. 5, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/10/05/epa-
climate-rule-withdrawal-cost-calculations-243520. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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‘transparent way,’ with the agency producing an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).187 
Testimony provided by a witness from the Brookings Institution 
traced the history of cost and benefit assessment during the recent past, 
noting that before the Obama Administration’s Executive Orders, the 
practice for the past two decades, as well as the congressionally stated 
purpose of the Clean Air Act, was not to consider global benefits and to 
focus on domestic benefits exclusively: 
I believe that the exclusive focus on a global measure runs counter 
to standard benefit–cost practice, in which only the benefits within 
the political jurisdiction bearing the cost of the policy are considered. 
It also seems at odds with the expressed intent of long-standing 
executive orders and of authorizing statutes. For example, the main 
regulatory guidance document that has been in place for over 20 
years is Executive Order 12866, which makes clear that the 
appropriate reference point for analyzing federal regulatory policies 
is the U.S citizenry, not the world. And a subsequent guidance 
document by the Office of Management and Budget (known as 
Circular A-4) maintained an emphasis on domestic benefits. 
Similarly, when enacting the Clean Air Act, Congress stated that its 
purpose was to “protect and enhance the quality of the Nation’s air 
resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and 
productive capacity of its population,” which again suggests a focus 
on domestic benefits. Similar language is found in other authorizing 
statutes for environmental regulations.188 
The Clean Air Act Section 111 was used as the legal predicate for 
the CPP.189  EPA initially estimated that the CPP would yield about 30 
billion dollars in global climate benefits by 2030.190  Of note, this thirty 
billion dollar estimate included only approximately two to seven billion 
dollars in domestic benefits, which was less than the estimated domestic 
costs of 5.1-8.4 billion dollars per year.191 According to an analysis and 
witness from the Brookings Institute: 
The difference between global and domestic benefits of greenhouse 
gas regulations is significant, as the global measure is 4 to 14 times 
greater than the estimated domestic measure. For example, for its 
proposed regulations for existing power plants, the EPA estimated 
climate benefits amounting to $30 billion in 2030. However, the 
 
 187. See id.; See EPA, EPA ADMINISTRATOR PRUITT PROPOSES COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS REFORM (June 7, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-administrator-
pruitt-proposes-cost-benefit-analysis-reform. 
 188. Gayer, supra note 182, at 2. 
 189. See supra notes 36, 48, 60. 
 190. Gayer, supra note 182, at 2. 
 191. Id. 
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estimated domestic climate benefits only amount to $2-$7 billion, 
which is less than EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of 
$7.3 billion. The use of a global social cost of carbon to estimate 
benefits means that agencies will adopt regulations that could cost 
Americans more than they receive in climate-related benefits. This 
approach could be especially problematic if U.S. actions simply shift 
emissions overseas.192 
The net cost-effectiveness of the CPP depends on whether one 
counts monetized benefits estimated to occur outside the United States 
and beyond the reach of U.S. law.  Domestic versus international 
benefits change the net benefits by a factor of approximately 1000 
percent.193  This single modeling choice swings a program that is cost-
justified globally to one which is not cost-justified domestically.194  For 
comparison of international benefits to the geographic location of costs, 
all costs of CPP are imposed domestically on U.S. power plants only.   
Some have noted that because the CPP does not address 
international CO2, the United States has no jurisdiction over what other 
nations do or do not do, and because the United States does not pay for 
what other nations do, international benefits have no place in a 
calculation involving U.S. carbon:  “It’s reasonable to count only the 
rule’s U.S. benefits since Americans would be paying the costs, said Jeff 
Holmstead, an industry lawyer who was EPA’s air administrator under 
former President George W. Bush.”195  The Trump EPA reverted to 
White House guidance from 2003, which directed regulators performing 
cost-benefit analyses to “focus on benefits and costs that accrue to 
citizens and residents of the United States.”196  This prior 2003 guidance 
stated that international implications should go into a separate report.197 
There also is a now developing novel international dimension.  The 
Obama Administration CPP cost-benefit analysis assumed that there will 
be dramatically more solar photovoltaic (PV) panels used to offset 
electric generation from existing coal-fired power, a large number of 
which s are either made in or compose key elements of the silicon and 
other materials produced  in China.198  China has significantly subpar 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. (citing a four to fourteen times multiplier, or 400-1400 percent increase in 
estimated benefits when counting global benefits instead of domestic benefits). 
 194. See EPA, supra note 187 (U.S. benefits of two to seven billion dollars are less than 
EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of 7.3 billion dollars). 
 195. Holden, supra note 184, at 4.  
 196. Id. at 5. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Katie Fehrenbacher, China is Utterly and Totally Dominating Solar Panels, 
FORTUNE MAG., June 18, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/06/18/china-is-utterly-and-totally-
dominating-solar-panels/. 
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environmental regulations compared to other major economies of the 
world.199  None of the environmental repercussions of more made-in-
China photovoltaic panels manufacturing are calculated as 
environmental costs in the original CPP cost analysis, because those 
environmental impacts of Chinese or other developing country 
manufacture occur outside of the United States.   
In fact, the makers of these Chinese PV panels were recently found 
by the International Trade Commission to have violated international 
trade laws.200  That panel has recommended the possibility that stiff 
import tariffs be imposed on these Chinese photovoltaic panels as a 
sanction for unfair trade practices.201  International environmental costs 
abroad of manufacture of alternative sources of power generation, which 
are thereafter exported to the United States, are not included in the cost 
calculation, although they were originally one of the building blocks of 
compliance and CPP benefits.202  Although it now looms as a question 
on the exercise of executive branch power on cost and benefit 
considerations, there is no court precedent on this question of first legal 
impression. 
D. Are ‘Co-Benefits’ a Legitmate Operand? 
Beyond international geography, there is a second issue of whether 
it is proper math to count “co-benefits” from pollutant reduction not 
regulated by the CPP as benefits of the CPP.  Even though the CPP is 
targeted at global warming and climate change goals, less than one-tenth 
of one percent of the estimated benefits of the CPP are from carbon 
reduction and warming mitigation; more than ninety-nine percent of the 
benefits are “co-benefits” from estimated reduction of criteria pollutants 
 
 199. Jonathan Kaiman, China Strengthens Environmental Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 
25, 2014) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/25/china-strengthens-
environmental-laws-polluting-factories. Even if China creates more environmental 
regulations, the problem lies in the implementation of these laws. Id. China is the largest 
carbon emitter in the world. 
 200. Kirsten Korosec, Why Rooftop Solar Might Get A Lot More Expensive in the U.S., 
FORTUNE MAG., Sept. 22, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/09/22/solar-costs-tariffs/. The 
International Trade Commission in September 2017 that imports of low-cost solar panels from 
China have hurt U.S. manufacturers. The decision gives the Trump Administration the power 
to issue steep tariffs on Chinese companies—where the majority are made—cutting off the 
flow of cheap panels to installers in the U.S. 
 201. Id. The claimant, Suniva, requested that solar cells brought into the United States 
have a forty-cent tariff, raising the minimum price to seventy-eight cents/watt, which is two-
thirds more expensive than the cheapest panels on the market. 
 202. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
ENERGY: THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS, https://www.oecd.org/futures/17738498.pdf. 
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which are not regulated by the CPP.203  Criteria pollutant impact is not 
global, but rather a function of geographic proximity of human receptors 
to the power plant sources emitting these criteria pollutants.204   
The degree of impact on benefits makes the prior 
international/national domestic calculus of benefits pale in comparison:  
Adding “co-benefits” to the CPP calculation boosts benefits by more 
than 10,000 percent.205  Here again, there is a dispute as to whether their 
inclusion is appropriate.  According to the Congressional Research 
Service:   
There are recurring questions regarding the methodologies used to 
estimate both costs and benefits, including what to choose as the 
baseline against which to measure changes resulting from a 
regulation; how to monetize improvements in public health, such as 
the avoidance of premature death; whether to count both direct 
benefits and co-benefits (i.e., benefits achieved that were not the 
purpose of the regulation); how to account for benefits for which 
there is no accepted measurement or valuation methodology; 
whether to include reductions in the “social cost of carbon” as a 
benefit and, if so, how to measure those benefits; and whether certain 
benefits or costs are double-counted when simultaneous proposals 
address the same pollutant.206   
Legislation has been introduced by Evan Jenkins, a Republican 
Representative from West Virginia, to prohibit EPA and the Department 
of Energy from including the social cost of controlling carbon and 
methane, greenhouse gases, or ancillary co-benefits of particulate matter 
reduction.207  Some states did not agree with the ability or discretion of 
EPA to count “co-benefits.”  For example, the Director of the Ohio EPA, 
in comments to U.S. EPA, stated: 
When U.S. EPA promulgates a revised National Ambient Air 
Quality Standard (NAAQS) it uses the amount of air quality 
improvement as a measure to determine benefits. If a facility installs 
controls to meet the NAAQS and also complies with the Utility 
MATS, plus Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), U.S. EPA 
 
 203. See CRS, supra note 172. The direct CPP direct benefits of mercury reductions were 
four to six million dollars, which increased one-thousand-fold when indirect co-benefits were 
added to make total benefits of CPP equal to thirty-seven to ninety billion dollars. Id. 
 204. EPA, EPA CLEAN POWER PLAN, Section IX: Community and Environmental Justice 
Considerations, 6 (Aug. 3, 2015), http://www.ceed.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/CPP-
Section-IX-Community-and-Environmental-Justice-Considerations.pdf. 
 205. “Co-benefits” increase from single digit million benefits to double-digit billion 
benefits. See supra note 203. 
 206. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 4 n.16. 
 207. Transparency and Honesty in Energy Regulations Act of 2017, H.R. 3117, 115th 
Cong. (2017). 
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should not double or even triple count those reductions as part of 
each rulemaking. The health benefit that U.S. EPA states is occurring 
can only occur once, not be recounted multiple times under separate 
U.S. EPA rulemakings. 208 
A search for EPA court decisions regarding counting of indirect co-
benefits or double-counting of benefits produces no precedent.  It 
remains an issue of first impression.  There is a purpose in counting “co-
benefits.”  The Obama Administration CPP expressly stated that it 
sought and intended to achieve its counted “co-benefits” by making it 
too expensive or difficult through CPP regulations for existing coal-fired 
power plants to continue operation, thereby expressly taking credit for 
other criteria pollutant reduction of “co-benefits” that operating coal-
fired power plants otherwise emit if they continue operating.209  The 
Obama Administration EPA added estimated indirect incidental “co-
benefits” related to reduction of criteria pollutants which were not 
regulated by the CPP rule.210  This altered the otherwise lopsided 
outcome of CPP private sector implementation costs far exceeding direct 
benefits of its regulated CO2 reduction.211  This fundamentally alters the 
outcome of the cost/benefit analysis of the CPP.   
The CPP regulation does not regulate or even mention any of these 
criteria pollutants whose claimed estimated reduction produces “co-
benefits,” even though it does state its motive to constrain operation of 
existing and future coal-fired power plants.212  These other criteria 
pollutants and hazardous air pollutants yielding “co-benefits” are already 
 
 208. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59; see also UTIL. AIR 
REGULATORY GRP. (UARG), COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO EPA’S SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING 
(Jan. 15, 2016) https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2009-0234-20557&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. “In 
order for there to be co-benefits from PM2.5 to attribute to the Proposed Rule, the Proposed 
Rule must require more reductions of primary PM2.5 and PM2.5 precursors (e.g., SO2 and NOx) 
than would otherwise occur under other existing regulations, including the current National 
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for PM2.5. To include any co-benefits from 
reductions that will occur anyway as a result of the current PM2.5 NAAQS in this rule would 
be to double-count those benefits—first as the direct benefits that were counted to justify the 
PM2.5 NAAQS in that rule’s 2006 RIA (EPA, 2006), and then again as co-benefits to justify 
this Proposed Rule.” 
 209. See supra notes 56-58. 
 210. See supra notes 205, 207, 211. 
 211. See EPA, supra note 187 (U.S. benefits of two to seven billion dollars are less than 
EPA’s estimated compliance costs for the rule of 7.3 billion dollars). 
 212. Id.; See also BRIAN F. MANNIX, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. REGULATORY 
STUDIES CTR., PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO 
EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS; REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
PROGRAM (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1866/f/downloads/EPA-
ACE-PIC-Mannix-10-30.pdf. 
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regulated to statutorily-required levels of “adequate” or “ample” margins 
of public health safety, respectively.213  We do not have any Supreme 
Court determination about the legal permissibility of a ‘new math’ 
algorithm counting “co-benefits” as a means for justification of specific 
regulations pursuant to administration law, although the Court reached 
the “cost” issue in 2015 for the first time on another matter.214  
This changed with the change of administrations:  The Trump 
administration in 2017 no longer considered the indirect CPP ‘co-
benefits’ related to chemicals not expressly regulated by the CPP as 
monetized benefits to be counted regarding the CPP.  Trump’s EPA will 
not count those ancillary reductions as ‘co-benefits’ where those criteria 
pollutants215 are already regulated by the EPA under other standards in 
the Clean Air Act.216  And most areas of the country are in compliance 
with the NAAQS required levels for criteria pollutants.217 
The Trump Administration counts zero benefits of reducing U.S. 
“co-benefits” below the national NAAQS standards for the six criteria 
pollutants.218  Critics charge that the scientific community thinks there 
would be additional health benefits from reductions beyond those 
required by the Clean Air Act.219  However, the Clean Air Act requires 
that these NAAQS levels have already been set at levels to “adequately 
protect” human health220 in each of the 264 Air Quality Control Districts 
(“AQCD”) in the United States.221  There has long been a difference 
between what scientists and/or EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory 
Committee (“CASAC”) state is the best or most protective 
recommended NAAQS level, and what EPA, in its judgment, 
 
 213. See FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, 
at figure 5.10. 
 214. See infra Section IV.C. 
 215. These include particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, sulfur dioxide, etc. See FERREY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 189, tbl. 5.1. 
 216. See Chris Mooney, Even Trump’s EPA says Obama’s Climate Plan Would Save 
Thousands of Lives Each Year, WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2017) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/01/trumps-epa-
says-obamas-climate-rule-could-prevent-up-to-4500-deaths-annually-moves-to-scrap-
it/?utm_term=.0077dfc3c4b0. 
 217. See EPA, AQCR NAAQS COMPLIANCE. 
 218. Environmentalists Blast EPA’s Cost-Benefit Review in CPP Repeal Effort, INSIDE 
EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Oct. 20, 2017. See also Kimberly Castle and Richard L. Levesz, 
Environmental Standards, Thresholds, and the Next Battleground of Climate Change 
Regulations, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2019. 
 219. Id. 
 220. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 
186-89. 
 221. Id. at 193. 
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establishes.222  The Trump Administration EPA issued a directive that 
no member of EPA advisory committees shall “be currently in receipt of 
EPA grants” or be “in a position that otherwise would reap substantial 
direct benefit from an EPA grant.”223 
While EPA exercises the ultimate legal authority over what it does 
in setting Clean Air Act standards, when the EPA’s decision differs from 
the EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s recommendation 
on an emission limit, EPA must provide an explanation.224  One circuit 
court found that the CASAC’s prior recommendation to have the 
standard “lowered from 0.080 ppm to no greater than 0.070 ppm” due to 
“overwhelming scientific evidence” was not a sufficiently clear 
statement to bind EPA.225  However, the CASAC must be clear in linking 
emission levels to definitive impacts on public health; the Supreme 
Court will not overrule EPA decisions without a clear scientific 
determination by the CASAC:  
Had CASAC reached a scientific conclusion that adverse health 
effects were likely to occur at the 0.070 ppm level, EPA’s failure to 
justify its uncertainty regarding the existence of adverse health 
effects at this level would be unacceptable . . . , [b]ut we were unable 
to determine whether CASAC reached any such scientific 
conclusion.226 
The court of appeals noted the great deference due an 
administrative agency in charge of implementing a standard, and 
“stressed that the agency had broad leeway in deciding how much of a 
scientific margin of safety was sufficient.”227  
 
 222. As one recent example, the EPA Clean Air Science Advisory Committee in 2014 
recommended that it was necessary to lower the ozone NAAQS to sixty ppb or below, from 
its then-current standard of seventy-five ppb, to protect public health and reduce premature 
deaths. The Obama Administration EPA in 2015 elected to not follow this advice, and lowered 
the standard to seventy ppb.  See Patrick Ambrosio, Ozone Standard of 60-70 parts per billion 
Appropriate to Protect Health EPA Staff Says, 45 ENV’T REP. 2519 (BNA), Sept. 5, 2014; see 
EPA, 2015 REVISION TO 2008 OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS 
(NAAQS) RELATED DOCUMENTS, https://www.epa.gov/ozone-pollution/2015-revision-
2008-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs-related. 
 223. See E. Scott Pruitt, Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Advisory 
Committees (Oct. 31, 2017) https://perma.cc/VZM2-VBKQ. 
 224. See Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 559 F.3d 512, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (EPA failed in 
the final rule to adequately explain its reason for not accepting the CASAC’s 
recommendation); see 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (2012). 
 225. See Miss. v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 226. Id. at 1357. 
 227. Steven Ferrey, Courts Cap the ‘Trade’: Regulation of Competitive Markets When 
Courts Overturn State and Federal Cap-And-Trade Regulation, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 681, 730 
(2014); see Miss. v. EPA, 723 F.3d 246, 254, 265 (D.C. Cir. 2013) amended and superseded 
by rehearing, 744 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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One can compare CPP cost-benefit values to all other regulations.  
A draft 2016 OMB report to Congress estimates that the annual benefits 
from all major regulations over the last ten years were between 208 
billion and 627 billion dollars, while their costs were between 57 billion 
and 85 billion dollars.228 OMB’s 2005 report to Congress, a decade 
earlier, estimated that major rules from the previous ten years provided 
benefits of 69.6 billion to 276.8 billion dollars, while costing between 
34.8 billion and 39.4 billion dollars.229  The CPP cost-benefit is a closer 
call, based on the inputs and assumptions that one makes with regard to 
counting ‘co-benefits’ and international benefits. 
As this article went to press, the matter of “co-benefits” in all EPA 
rulemakings became a major issue:  In 2018 EPA released an Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to re-examine all cost and benefit 
analysis by the agency.230  The notice references the Michigan231 and 
Entergy v. Riverkeeper232 Supreme Court decisions as mandating, or 
allowing, respectively, consideration of costs by the agency.233  EPA 
notes that a comment(s) submitted to the Agency “has justified the 
stringency of a standard based on the estimated benefits from reductions 
in pollutants not directly regulated by the action (i.e., “ancillary benefits” 
or “co-benefits”).”234  This potential new executive agency rulemaking 
on this transcendent issue moves the dispute in dimensions. 
 
 
 
 228. See OMB, 2016 DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES 
REFORM ACT, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/draft
_2016_cost_benefit_report_12_14_2016_2.pdf. 
 229. See OMB, VALIDATING REGULATORY ANALYSIS: 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON 
STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 1, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/2005_cb/fi
nal_2005_cb_report.pdf. 
 230. Increasing Consistency and Transparency in Considering Costs and Benefits in the 
Rulemaking Process (ANPR, 40 CFR Ch.I) at 6, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-
06/documents/cost_and_benefit_consideration_anprm_pre-
pub.pdf?utm_source=Federal+State+Policy+Updates+June+2018&utm_campaign=State+an
d+Federal+Updates&utm_medium=email. 
 231. See Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 232. See Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, 556 U.S. 208 (2009). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Maxine Joselow, Clean Air Advocates Worried by EPA’s Move to Rethink Cost-
Benefit Calculations, SCI. MAG. http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/06/clean-air-
advocates-worried-epa-s-move-rethink-cost-benefit-calculations. 
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IV. LEGAL DISPUTE CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
A. “Staying” Current Lex 
The CPP is in suspended legal animation amid these issues swirling 
about it.  As soon as the regulation was final, legal challenges to the 
Clean Power Plan were filed by more than 100 parties following its 
promulgation in October 2015.235 Those twenty-seven states challenging 
the EPA CPP rule and the eighteen states supporting it are illustrated in 
Figure 2.236 The ongoing and pending legal challenge to the CPP is not 
yet through the appellate process nor heard by the Supreme Court, 
however, petitioners sought a stay from the D.C. Circuit, which denied 
the request.237 The D.C. Circuit denied the stay in 2015 because they 
noted that there are extraordinary standards on the issuance of 
extraordinary writs.238   
 
 235. See id.; See also TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 13. 
 236. CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, CLEAN POWER PLAN: LEGAL BACKGROUND AND 
PENDING LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA V. EPA, R44480 (Mar. 8, 2017) at 13, fig. 1, 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44480.pdf. 
 237. See Gavin Bade, DC Circuit Court Denies Stay on EPA Clean Power Plan, UTILITY 
DIVE (Jan. 21, 2016). The three judge panel stated that the parties had not satisfied the 
“stringent requirements” necessary for a stay. Id. 
 238. W. Va. v. EPA, Case No. 15-1277 (Sept. 9, 2015) (citing Reynolds Metals Co. v. 
FERC, 777 F.2d 760, 762-63 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. 
Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
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Figure 2 
 
The Supreme Court thereafter granted a stay on February 9, 2016,239 
in less than three weeks after it was applied for.240  The Supreme Court’s 
dissent on the stay was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan,241 not wanting to stay the CPP during the Obama 
Administration.  The Court’s order granting the stay applied directly to 
EPA’s CPP rule, rather than to a lower court judicial decision on appeal 
as it usually does when a lower court decision is on appeal.242  No party 
in the matter was able to point to any previous case in which the Supreme 
Court had stayed an agency rule before any court had reviewed it on its 
 
 239. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016); see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Put the 
Brakes on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 9, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-
puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f71. 
 240. The first application for a stay was filed on January 21, 2016; the Court granted the 
stay on February 9, 2016. This stay before a court of appeals decision on the merits was 
deemed by the Congressional Research Service as “unusual.” CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 
supra note 236, at 15. 
 241. W. Va. v. EPA, No. 15A773 (Feb. 9, 2016) (order staying the CPP). 
 242. Id. 
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merits.243  After being reversed by the Supreme Court granting a stay, 
the D.C. Circuit found that the Supreme Court stay not only relieved 
EPA of its enforcement obligation, but also relieved EPA of its statutory 
duty to regulate carbon for the indefinite future.244  
Some commentators posit that this was not a surprising outcome, 
given the ruling requiring EPA to consider costs before issuing Clean 
Air Act regulations, in Michigan.245  Pending subsequent decisions, the 
Trump Administration EPA now seeks the D.C. Circuit to delay further 
action.246  The Trump Administration argues that given its discretion to 
withdraw and repeal the CPP, a court decision on its merits would be 
moot.247  Environmental groups have continued to press for a decision 
of the D.C. Circuit court that the CPP was, and is, legally promulgated 
with executive discretion without Congressional approval.248  
Media attention has focused on numeric aspects of the Trump’s 
repeal two, enact one regulatory ratio. 249  Not as much noticed, but of 
much more legal significance and lasting importance, are what could 
become common law permanent changes to what courts will deem legal 
versus unpermitted executive action or regulation.  Under the radar of 
 
 243. See Robert Percival, In Blocking EPA Clean Power Plan, is the Supreme Court 
Wading Deeper Into Politics?, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 12, 2017), 
http://theconversation.com/in-blocking-epa-clean-power-plan-is-the-supreme-court-wading-
deeper-into-politics-54513. 
 244. W. Va., v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (Aug. 8, 2017) (order determining the effect of the stay 
of the CPP). 
 245. See Adler, supra note 239. As a side note, there was no stay granted to the plaintiffs 
in the Supreme Court Michigan decision resulting in power plants paying for later-stricken 
upgrades to comply with EPA’s rulemaking during the litigation only to have it overturned by 
the Supreme Court for the lack of cost-of-compliance analysis done by EPA for the § 112 
regulations. By the time the order was invalidated, the costs were expended and plants were 
at, or near compliance with the invalidated rulemaking, as suggested in Petitioners application 
for stay. 
 246. Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 16-1127 (D.C. Cir.), motion filed Apr. 18, 2017. 
 247. See Cogan Schneier, EPA Moves to Kill Clean Power Plan as Lawsuit Languishes in 
DC Circuit, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 10, 2017). “Technically, [finalizing the rescission] should moot 
the challenges to the Clean Power Plan because, at that point, it wouldn’t exist anymore,’ said 
Crowell & Moring partner Thomas Lorenzen, who argued on behalf of the National Rural 
Electric Cooperative Association and other involved industry groups.” 
 248. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, LIST OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CLEAN POWER 
PLAN IN COURT, 
https://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/content/list_of_supporters_of_the_clean_power_plan
_in_court.pdf. Among this list, there are eighteen states listed in addition to Washington D.C. 
Id. There are also sixty municipalities, several power companies, high tech companies, leading 
consumer brands, advanced energy associations, business associations, and 208 members of 
Congress. Id.   
 249. See Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Donald Trump Promises To Eliminate Two Regulations 
For Every One Enacted, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2016/11/22/donald-trump-promises-to-eliminate-
two-regulations-for-every-one-enacted/#5ad62b1f4586. 
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most observers, President Trump in a single sentence directed all 
executive agencies to ensure that the “incremental cost” of all new 
regulations is no greater than zero.250   
While this may seem ministerial and not as significant as many of 
the President’s other tweets, it could alter the future of executive action, 
EPA rulemaking, and Chevron deference to executive interpretation of 
their own authority and rulemaking.  What makes this of high-level 
significance, is a decision of the Supreme Court a year before the Trump 
election.251  This decision, for the first time in the history of U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, elevated the consideration of costs (and 
benefits) as a necessary prerequisite to justify EPA regulation.252  Never 
before has the Court required such a quantitative evaluation as a pre-
requisite hurdle to rulemaking.253  Thus, the last three decades of modern 
Chevron deference254 to executive branch and EPA initiatives, is 
constrained and perhaps altered longer-term.  
The Supreme Court largely upheld EPA’s authority to regulate 
greenhouse gases under the agency’s New Source Review (“NSR”) 
program.255  There is a series of three recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court, culminating in Michigan, when coupled with the ongoing cost 
challenge on the Clean Power Plan, which may fundamentally change 
U.S. administrative and constitutional law.  By injecting, for the first 
time as matters of first impression, cost considerations into rulemaking, 
we are witnessing a substantial change in the separation of powers and 
discretion in American law.  The foundation of Chevron256 deference is 
altered. 
B. Legal “Tailoring”  
In 2010, the Obama Administrator implemented its GHG 
“Tailoring Rule,” which provided for a phasing in of Clean Air Act Title 
V and Prevention of Significant Deterioration/New Source Review 
(PSD/NSR) permitting requirements for CO2,257 although taking the 
 
 250. See Cheri A. Budzynski, The First Six Months of the Trump Administration: Will 
Trump Successfully Deregulate U.S. EPA? LEXOLOGY (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=287657ec-82cd-4784-98cd-d9edc44a0783. 
 251. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710 (2015). 
 252. Id.; See also infra Section IV.C. 
 253. See infra text accompanying notes 300-07. 
 254. Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 255. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2457-58 (2014). 
 256. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
 257. JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, EPA REGULATION OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES AND OPTIONS (Feb. 5, 2015), 7-5700, 
R41212; The Clean Air Act does not specifically regulate CO2 emissions. It was held in Mass. 
v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, that the EPA could choose to regulate CO2 emitted by vehicle engines, 
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unusual step that 99.65 percent of the otherwise regulated facilities under 
the Clean Air Act would not have to meet the CO2 standard.258  The 
“Tailoring Rule” defined which stationary sources would be required to 
obtain Clean Air Act permits for GHG emissions.259  The Clean Air Act 
imposes on stationary sources of pollution preconstruction permits if 
they have the potential to emit more than 100 tons per year (tpy) of any 
air pollutant (for some cases, 250 tons per year).  EPA declined to impose 
this statutory standard on CO2 emissions.260   
When the EPA applied these same standards to “any source” of 
greenhouse gas emissions at the 250 tpy Clean Air Act thresholds, 
several smaller sources, such as “large office and residential buildings, 
hotels, large retail establishments, and similar facilities” fell into the 
group whose emissions were regulated.261  Applying the Clean Air Act 
PSD provision at their specified 250 tpy threshold set in the statute to 
the regulation of CO2 emissions would increase the number of covered 
sources under just this one program from 280 emitting sources of CO2 
proposed by EPA to more than 80,000 sources.262  The EPA’s legal 
justification was that this would lead to the “absurd result” of affecting 
as many as six million sources of GHG emissions.263   
EPA chose only to regulate those sources whose GHG emissions 
exceeded 75,000 (for modification) or 100,000 tpy (for new 
construction).264  However, the Clean Air Act Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration provisions, which provided the congressional authority to 
EPA, cover all “major sources” that potentially can emit 100 or 250 tons 
of the relevant criteria pollutant annually.265  This disparity of 
 
if it determined that CO2 was a general pollutant that endangered public health. EPA 
subsequently so ruled, despite Justice Scalia’s dissent noting that such an interpretation of 
what it could regulate in the air would cover “everything airborne, from Frisbees to 
flatulence.” Subsequently, the EPA chose to extend this regulation to CO2 emitted by larger 
power plants, which are stationary, rather than mobile, sources of pollution. 
 258. Author’s calculation: EPA claimed that this “tailoring” would reduce the number of 
facilities regulated from more than 80,000 with the requirement set at 250 tpy, to 280 with the 
threshold raised to 75,000 tpy or 100,000 tpy, or a reduction of 99.65 percent; see also id. 
 259. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 
(Final Rule) 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
 260. See id. 
 261. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. 
 262. Coal. for Responsible Regulation v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 263. “The ‘absurd results’ doctrine, which authorizes agencies to apply statutory 
requirements differently than a literal reading would indicate, as necessary to . . . avoid absurd 
results. . ..” 75 Fed. Reg. 31,516, 31,536 (preamble) (June 3, 2010). 
 264. 75 Fed. Reg. 31,523. 
 265. Id. “Facilities seeking to qualify for a PSD permit must, inter alia, comply with 
emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each 
pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act. Section 7475(a)(4)….The Act neither compels 
nor permits EPA to adopt an interpretation of the Act requiring a source to obtain a PSD or 
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quantitative value by a factor of 400:1, conflicted with the basic elements 
of the Clean Air Act PSD requirements for six criteria air pollutants.266   
Challengers argued that GHG regulation was not intended to apply 
to Title V of the Act or its PSD requirements without the Congress or 
EPA rewriting the statutory provisions of the Clean Air Act.267  A 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court ending its 2014 term, upheld these 
EPA rules in part, although this unilateral agency “tailoring” of the 
quantitative value was not permissible when the Congress had set a 
standard:   
When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an 
unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American 
economy,” Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S., at 159, we typically greet 
its announcement with a measure of skepticism.268  
Where the so-called “tailoring rule” administratively increased the 
numeric regulatory threshold by 40,000 percent from 250 tpy to 100,000 
tpy, the Supreme Court held:   
EPA lacked authority to ‘tailor’ the Act’s unambiguous numerical 
thresholds of 100 or 250 tons per year to accommodate its 
greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the permitting triggers.  
Agencies must always “ ‘ give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.’ ”   Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665. The power to execute the laws does not 
include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to 
work in practice.269 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that EPA cannot unilaterally exercise 
greater than delegated executive authority to rewrite or refashion, 
regardless of convenience or the impossibility of following 
congressional command, stated within the Clean Air Act:  “EPA’s 
interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an 
enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority 
 
Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions”…. “where the term 
“air pollutant” appears in the Act’s operative provisions, EPA has routinely given it a 
narrower, context-appropriate meaning.” Massachusetts did not invalidate those longstanding 
constructions…. Concerns that BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack 
controls, is fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse-gas regulation, which is more about energy 
use, are not unfounded. UARG v. EPA, No. 12-1146, slip op. at 1-2, 11 (S. Ct. June 23, 2014). 
 266. Id.; See EPA, CRITERIA AIR POLLUTANTS, https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-
pollutants; see supra note 258 (EPA changed threshold from 250 tpy to 100,000 tpy, a 400:1 
differential). 
 267. UARG, slip op. at 12. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 20-24. 
1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2019  4:24 PM 
2019] A LEGAL “JURISDICTIONAL TRAIN WRECK” 43 
without clear congressional authorization,” where a court should 
demand “clear congressional authorization.” 270 
The Court concluded that EPA’s interpretation of the Act could not 
change or invent quantitative values or change the statutory math, and 
invalidated EPA’s “Tailoring Rule” on the grounds that it purported to 
amend the statute: 
We conclude that EPA’s rewriting of the statutory thresholds was 
impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency’s 
interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power 
to “tailor” legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting 
unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise discretion only in 
the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must 
always “ ‘ give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.’ ” 271   
Courts since the UARG decision, have relied on UARG to prohibit 
the EPA and other executive branch agencies from exercising regulatory 
authority to change or expand on the plain language of congressional 
statutes.272  This legal principle has implications for the ongoing CPP 
issue.273  Costs are an issue, their determination is quantitative, and 
agencies can no longer “tailor” plain language in a statute.274  The agency 
must figure out what can and cannot be counted, and do the math on 
 
 270. Id. (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)). 
 271. Id. at 21. Justice Scalia wrote that the EPA lacked the authority to change threshold 
limits set by Congress, but it may still regulate greenhouse gas emissions provided they were 
already regulated for emitting “conventional pollutants.” Nat’l Ass’n. of Home Builders v. 
Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U. S., at 843).   
EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require best available control technology (BACT) for 
greenhouse gases emitted by sources that were otherwise subject to PSD review because of 
their emission of conventional pollutants. Those “anyway” sources could only be required to 
comply with greenhouse-gas BACT if they emitted more than a de minimis amount of 
greenhouse gases. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. 
 272. In Conservation Law Fund., Inc. v. Pruitt, 881 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2018), the court 
emphasized not extending EPA jurisdiction over previously unregulated sources. This 
decision however has not been limited to just environmental law. In U.S. v. Messina, 806 F.3d 
55, 67 (2d. Cir. 2015), analyzing the language of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 
1996, the court relied on UARG v. EPA, to declare that plain meaning statutory language did 
not require additional inquiry. 
 273. “To sum up: We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted 
the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary sources based on their 
greenhouse-gas emission s. Specifically, the Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a 
pollutant for purposes of defining a “major emitting facility” (or a “modification” thereof) in 
the PSD context or a “major source” in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations 
purport to do so, they are invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a 
“pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” for purposes of requiring BACT for 
“anyway” sources.” UARG, slip op. at 29. 
 274. See supra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. 
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costs and benefits accordingly.  The UARG ‘tailoring’ opinion rejected 
the agency’s primary rationale for deference. 275 
C. Required Consideration of Regulatory Costs 
1. Mercury and Air Toxics Standards  
Mercury regulation of power plant emissions originated before the 
Obama Administration, despite its imprint and litigation surrounding it 
being associated with the Obama Administration CPP.  In 2005, EPA 
promulgated regulations establishing a cap-and-trade system to limit 
emissions of mercury from coal-fired power plants.  Immediately, the 
rules were challenged; the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals struck and 
vacated the mercury regulation in 2008.276   
EPA thereafter agreed to propose and promulgate Maximum 
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) Mercury Air Toxics standards 
for mercury emissions before the end of 2011.277  “The final rule sets 
standards for all hazardous air pollutants . . . emitted by coal- and oil-
fired electric generating units . . . with a capacity of 25 megawatts or 
greater.”278  Any existing source would have approximately take four 
years to comply with the new MATS, and then, under the Clean Air Act, 
could be granted an additional year by its state.279   
Section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to regulate 
hazardous air pollutants from power plants only if it concludes that 
 
 275. See Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013); “[T]he question a court faces when 
confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers is . . . whether the agency 
has ‘stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.’ Arlington v. FCC, No. 11–1545, slip 
op. at 5 (S. Ct. 2013) (emphasis deleted).” Id. at 10 (citing Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 
(May 20, 2013)). 
 276. N.J. v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 579-84 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating the mercury rule). 
 277. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). EPA stated that the standards for existing units, promulgated February 16, 
2012, could be met by fifty-six percent of coal-and oil-fired electric generating units using 
pollution control equipment already installed; the other forty-four percent would be required 
to install technology that would reduce uncontrolled mercury and acid gas emissions by about 
ninety percent, at an annual cost of 9.6 billion dollars. 
 278. EPA, BASIC INFORMATION, https://www.epa.gov/mats/basic-information-about-
mercury-and-air-toxics-standards; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 
77 Fed. Reg. 9304. This affects larger coal plants, if coal is greater than ten percent of fuel 
input, and the unit is greater than twenty-five Mw capacity, produces electricity for sale, and 
supplies more than one-third of its potential output to any utility power distribution system, 
unless its annual capacity factor is less than eight percent of rating (i.e. only used for peaking 
purposes). See id. at 9309, 9369. 
 279. Id. 
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regulation is “appropriate and necessary.”280 In reaching that conclusion, 
EPA stated that cost was irrelevant, and this was found by the Supreme 
Court to be beyond the bounds of reasonable interpretation and was 
‘capricious’ regarding what was “appropriate and necessary.”281  The 
new Mercury Air Toxic Standards (MATS) promulgated by EPA were 
estimated to avert up to 11,000 premature deaths, 4,700 heart attacks, 
and 130,000 asthma attacks every year.282  However, virtually none of 
this was related to what the rule regulated directly.283   
Almost all of the value of estimated avoided deaths and monetized 
benefits come from the rule’s effect on emissions of particulates, ‘co-
benefits,’ rather than from identified reduction of mercury and other air 
toxic chemical exposure.284  What made the rule more controversial is 
that the co-benefits associated with fine particulate matter (“PM2.5”) 
reductions comprised the overwhelming majority of all benefits 
attributed to the MATS regulations by EPA.285  PM2.5 is already 
otherwise heavily regulated as a criteria pollutant by EPA under other 
NAAQS provisions of the Act and regulations.286 EPA designed the rule, 
in part, to achieve through executive action PM2.5 emissions reductions 
that were in excess of what it could lawfully compel using provisions of 
the Act authorizing direct regulation of PM2.5.  MATS was specifically 
aimed at reducing power plants’ emissions of toxic air pollutants rather 
than criteria pollutants, including toxic arsenic, chromium, nickel, 
hydrochloric acid and hydrofluoric acid, in addition to mercury.287  
 
 280. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
 281. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2710-11 (2015). 
 282. EPA, MATS-HEALTHIER AMERICANS (Nov.  2012), 
https://www.epa.gov/mats/healthier-americans. 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07. 
 284. For more in-depth discussion, see supra Section III.D. 
 285. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07. 
 286. 40 C.F.R. Part 50. 
 287. Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412 (2013). See Reconsideration of 
Certain New Source Issues, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,073, (Apr. 24, 2013); EPA, FACT SHEET: 
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS FOR POWER PLANTS 1, 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-
11/documents/20111221matssummaryfs.pdf. Regarding HAPs, see FERREY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 574. The 1990 
amendments to the Clean Air Act included the HAPs and “Good Neighbor” provisions, which 
provided the statutory authority for EPA to implement MATS and CSAPR, respectively. 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 549, 104 Stat. 2399; National Emission 
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9425-28 (Feb. 16, 2012); Federal 
Implementation Plans, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,216 (Aug. 8, 2011). The 1999 amendments 
revised the NSPS provision which authorized EPA to apply MATS to new coal- and oil-fired 
power plants. Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory Relief Act of 
1999, 106 Pub. L. No. 40, 113 Stat. 207; Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
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In both motive and its calculus, this closely parallels the ongoing 
CPP battle: 
 It was designed economically to discourage operation of coal-fired 
power plants 
 It was not cost-effective unless unregulated criteria pollutant ‘co-
benefits’ were counted 
 Indirect, unregulated ‘co-benefits’ comprised the vast majority of 
benefits to make the regulation cost-beneficial 
2. Legal Challenge 
Numerous parties petitioned the courts for review of the MATS 
mercury and air toxics rule, contending that EPA failed to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis or cost consideration in its initial determination that 
control of air toxics from electric power plants was “appropriate and 
necessary,” and moreover, alleged that the agency’s later cost-benefit 
analysis demonstrated that the rule’s direct benefits failed this test.288  A 
circuit court reviews a challenged agency actions pursuant to § 
706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, under an “arbitrary 
[and] capricious” standard.289  The Act requires federal agencies to 
consider on the record public comments to proposed rules.290  In a 
different energy rule challenge, the D.C. Circuit construed whether it 
was arbitrary and capricious when FERC did not respond to the 
petitioner’s objections to a rule or order.291  The court held that the 
agency’s decision must answer and address seemingly legitimate 
comments and objections to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act 
standard,292 and the agency decision was arbitrary and capricious once 
the agency failed to address an affected party’s objections.293 
When challenged regarding the MATS rule, the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals found that the action was not arbitrary and capricious because 
EPA demonstrated a reasonable connection between its actions and the 
record of decision, and it was accorded Chevron deference.294  A 
 
 288. TOO MUCH, TOO LITTLE, OR ON TRACK?, supra note 59, at 19. 
 289. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (“The reviewing court shall. . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. . . .”). 
 290. FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 
47. 
 291. PPL Wallingford Energy LLC v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 419 F.3d 1194, 
1198 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1200. 
 294. U.S. CHAMBER LITIG. CTR., STALLION ENERGY CENTER LLC, ET AL. V. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.chamberlitigation.com/cases/white-
stallion-energy-center-llc-et-al-v-environmental-protection-agency-epa-12-1100. 
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dissenting opinion agreed with the industry petitioners that 
EPA unreasonably excluded cost considerations and economic impacts 
when determining whether MACT regulation of power plant hazardous 
air pollutants (HAPs) is “appropriate and necessary.”295  The NAAQS 
provisions specifically do not provide for cost considerations.296  By 
contrast, for MACT regulation of power plant HAPs as relevant with 
MATS, pursuant to §112(n)(1)(A), has more flexible language on 
“appropriate and necessary” regulation.297   
When the D.C. Circuit Court upheld the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards applying to 
existing coal-and oil-fired electric generating units, it relied in part upon 
Supreme Court precedent establishing that EPA is under no obligation 
to consider costs in establishing NAAQS under other provisions of the 
Clean Air Act that similarly fail to mention cost as a relevant 
consideration.298  On that issue the court split, but the majority deferred 
to EPA’s technical judgment.299   
The matter proceeded on appeal to the Supreme Court by a coalition 
of more than twenty states.300  During oral arguments members of the 
Supreme Court were critical of EPA cost-benefit analysis which 
attributed billions of dollars in annual public health co-benefits to 
reduction of fine particulate matter and other pollutants regulated under 
other sections of the Clean Air Act other than the MATS mercury 
 
 295. The dissent by Judge Kavanaugh believed that the majority over-read the ruling in 
Whitman, by ignoring the important difference between how the Clean Air Act provisions 
govern NAAQS rulemaking and the MACT regulation of power plant HAPs. Whitman stated 
that the EPA may not take costs into consideration when setting national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS). Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., Inc., 175 F.3d 1027 (2001); 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 108(a), 109(b). 
 296. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7408(a); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7409(b)(1). What this means is that if an air 
pollutant is emitted by “numerous or diverse mobile stationary sources and the associated air 
pollutant is reasonably anticipated to endanger public health or welfare, then pursuant to § 
108(a), the EPA must establish NAAQS for those pollutants, and pursuant to § 109(b), those 
standards must be “requisite to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety.”  
 297. 42 U.S.C. § 7421(n)(1)(A). This requires the EPA to study and issue a report on the 
public health hazards anticipated to occur as a result of power plant HAP emissions, and then 
apply MACT regulation “if” the Administrator finds such regulation is “appropriate and 
necessary,” which are not defined. 
 298. White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, No. 12-1100, 748 F.3d. 1222 (D.C. Cir., 
Apr. 15, 2014). A total of thirty petitions for review, including petitions brought by twenty-
four states, were filed in the D.C. Circuit matter. 
 299. This included challenges to EPA’s determination of what was achievable by the best 
performing twelve percent of sources (i.e., the “MACT floor”) and the supporting data. Id. at 
1250-1251. 
 300. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2699-2704 (2015).  The court granted certiorari to 
and consolidated three separate petitions filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the 
National Mining Association and twenty-one states. Fifteen states supported EPA’s MATS 
regulation before the Court. 
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standards.301  EPA could only quantify four to six million dollars in 
benefits to reductions of hazardous air pollutants, a fraction of one 
percent of the EPA-claimed long-term benefits of thirty-seven to ninety 
billion dollars annually; EPA provided no statistical basis or medical 
proof.302  Chief Justice Roberts called it an “end-run” around the 
statutory language which “raises the red flag” regarding counting as 
much as ninety billion dollars of benefits under the MATS rule from 
reductions of pollutants that are regulated under other sections of the 
Clean Air Act.303  The Supreme Court thereafter overturned MATS 
because: 
EPA must consider cost—including cost of compliance—before 
deciding whether regulation is appropriate and necessary . . . . One 
would not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to 
impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few 
dollars in health or environmental benefits.304   
The majority in Michigan stated that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’ 
if it does significantly more harm than good.”305  Quoting Justice 
Breyer’s concurring opinion in Riverkeeper, the majority further 
reasoned that: 
Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when 
deciding whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the 
understanding that reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying 
attention to the advantages and the disadvantages of agency 
decisions. It also reflects the reality that “too much wasteful 
expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably 
fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps 
more serious) problems.” Against the backdrop of this established 
administrative practice, it is unreasonable to read an instruction to an 
administrative agency to determine whether “regulation is 
appropriate and necessary” as an invitation to ignore cost.306  
 
 301. See Patrick Ambrosio, High Court Appears Split on EPA Decision Not to Consider 
Cost of Mercury Regulation, BLOOMBERG BNA, https://www.bna.com/high-court-appears-
n17179924569/. During oral argument, Justice Antonin Scalia described EPA as an 
“outrageously expensive” agency action where the cost vastly exceeds the benefit as a “classic 
arbitrary and capricious” act, “I would think that’s a violation of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, even without the word ‘appropriate’” Id. Chief Justice John Roberts noted that the EPA 
“deliberately tied its hands” where “agencies usually like to maintain for themselves as much 
discretion as they can;” “It’s a very important principle of administrative law that we will only 
uphold a rule based on the arguments that were considered and addressed by the agency.” Id. 
 302. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2706.   
 303. See Ambrosio, supra note 301. 
 304. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707, 2711-12. 
 305. Id. at 2707. 
 306. Id. at 2707-08. 
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There is no prior precedent on this benefit-accounting issue.  The 
Michigan Supreme Court decision did not dictate the future EPA choice 
of cost analysis.307  However the agency chooses it, its methodology still 
can be reviewed by the Supreme Court under the “hard-look” doctrine 
established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe.308 This 
decision was roundly criticized by former Supreme Court Justice John 
Paul Stevens, who noted its truncation of his decision for deference in 
Chevron:   
Ignoring dictionary definitions of the adjective “appropriate” (which 
do not mention the word “costs”) and the fact that the word 
“necessary” might well impose a duty to regulate even if costs were 
excessive, the Court held that the EPA’s initial decision to regulate 
was defective because it had failed to include any reference to the 
costs of regulation. Instead of simply accepting the plain meaning of 
a Congressional command or deferring to the agency’s reasonable 
interpretation of a statute that it administers—as Chevron requires—
the Court invalidated regulations that took years to draft… As a 
former English major in college, and as the author of the majority 
opinion in Chevron, I find that conclusion truly mind-boggling. Such 
a free-wheeling statutory decision can do even more harm—both to 
the public health and to the Court itself—than misinterpretations of 
the Constitution.309 
Where Chevron does not apply, courts apply the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review.310  If Chevron deference does not apply 
to a particular agency action, then under the Supreme Court Skidmore 
decision, while not controlling upon the courts, this presumptively 
causes the body of agency experience and informed judgment to serve 
as a guide for the court.311  An agency is not afforded any deference to 
its position where it makes a determination that is not embodied in a 
regulation.312 Deference is only afforded to an agency interpretation 
where “it appears that congress delegated authority to the agency to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation 
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”313 
There is general judicial deference to the substance of 
administrative rules if it turns on disputed issues of technical fact or 
 
 307. Id. at 2711-12. 
 308. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
 309. John Paul Stevens Speech, supra note 20. 
 310. See Volpe, 401 U.S. 402; see also FERREY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: EXAMPLES & 
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 77, at 69-73. 
 311. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 312. U.S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
 313. Id. at 227. 
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policy, or if the statute does not precisely answer the question the rule 
addresses, as in Chevron.  Interpretive rules that are not rulemakings and 
do not enjoy the strong deference accorded legislative rulemaking by an 
agency, but still enjoy an initial presumption of (Skidmore) deference.314  
In some cases, courts will strike interpretive rules made by an 
agency on the ground that the rules were in fact legislative rules that 
require a full notice and comment, under formal or informal 
rulemaking.315  While distinguishing between legislative and interpretive 
rules thus is critical, there is little agreement among the courts on this 
distinction. Where mathematical or technical standards are imposed, or 
a new duty is imposed on a party by the rule, this typically requires the 
formal requisites of APA notice and comment.316 
Justice Antonin Scalia noted in Whitman v. American Trucking 
Associations that the statutory language is “absolute.”317  The Supreme 
Court in United States v. Mead Corp. acknowledged that Chevron 
recognizes that Congress can be found to have implicitly delegated 
discretionary authority to an administrative agency.318  In City of 
Arlington v. FCC, the majority held that Chevron deference applies to 
an agency’s interpretation of the scope of its own statutory jurisdiction: 
“statutory ambiguities will be resolved, within the bounds of reasonable 
interpretation, not by the courts but by the administering agency.”319  The 
Supreme Court held that federal agencies are entitled to deference to 
agency discretion in devising regulations, as per Chevron.320  This 
overruled a determination that federal rules did not defer sufficiently to 
state implementation.321  However, there were other precursors of this 
 
 314. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Christiensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (An 
agency’s interpretive rule concerning a regulation is given stronger deference by the court, 
than an interpretive rule concerning a statute); Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding 
EPA rulemaking under Section 3004 of RCRA arbitrary and capricious where the agency 
relied on an analytical model that they knew was flawed and not an accurate predictor). 
 317. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 465. Justice Scalia, reflecting on the proper role of the 
judiciary, wrote that the statute “unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-
setting process, and thus ends the matter for us as well as the EPA.” Id. at 471. 
 318. Mead, 533 U.S. at 229. 
 319. Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). The Court noted that, under 
Chevron, the Court must first ask whether Congress directly spoke to the precise question at 
issue; if so, the Court must give effect to Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent, and if 
“the statute is silent or ambiguous,” the court must defer to the administering agency’s 
construction of the statute so long as it is permissible. Id. (quoting Chevron v. Nat’l Res. Def. 
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). See also AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 
(1999). 
 320. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1609-10 (2014). 
 321. Id. While employing a different mechanism than CAIR to address cross-state 
pollution, the D.C. Circuit found that it required some states to reduce emissions by more than 
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Chevron retreat.  Chief Justice Roberts’ dissenting opinion in Arlington 
v. FCC warned about “the danger posed by the growing power of the 
administrative state.”322 
The Clean Air Act also provides no detailed guidance as to where 
the cost line lies or how it should be calculated.  The Act’s Section 112 
does not require that HAP emission control costs can be compared with 
benefits of reduced HAP toxic pollutants.323  The Michigan Court noted 
that costs include the upfront cost of implementation, but also include 
the cost of compliance with the rulemaking. 324 If challengers can 
successfully categorize reduced revenues from fewer generation hours 
of operation of a facility as costs of complying with the regulation, 
EPA’s rulemaking could be deemed as not benefit-positive and 
unreasonable.  
Citing King v. Burwell,325 the challengers submitted that the EPA 
would require explicit authority from Congress to regulate an area in 
which it does not regularly participate (e.g. electricity generation) or to 
implement aggressive measures to reorganize how power is generated 
and sold in America.326 In King, the court held that the Internal Revenue 
Service would not be granted Chevron deference because the Internal 
Revenue Service IRS) does not have expertise in crafting health 
insurance policies; Congress would have to grant express authority to 
the agency.327 
 
what they contributed to downwind state pollution. EME Homer City Generation, 696 F.3d 7, 
25 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). Fifteen states sought review of CSAPR, 
while nine states intervened to support the rule. Id. at 9-10. 
 322. Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Robert, C.J., dissenting). 
 323. 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
 324. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must consider cost—including, most 
importantly, cost of compliance—before deciding whether regulation of power plants under 
the Clean Air Act is appropriate and necessary. See Clean Air Act, § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 
U.S.C.A. § 7412(n)(1)(A). Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711. 
 325. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 326. Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. in Support of Petitioner at 5, King, 135 S. 
Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114); see also Brief of 166 State & Local Bus. Ass’ns as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 25-26, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114) (citing FPC v. S. Cal. 
Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1964)). 
 327. “When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, we often apply the two-step 
framework announced in Chevron. Under that framework, we ask whether the statute is 
ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach is 
premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from 
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may 
be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such implicit delegation.” 
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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3. Next Steps 
Similar arguments were expressed by others opposing the MATS 
rule based on EPA’s alleged double-counting of benefits.  The EPA’s 
reliance on the benefits from these massive criteria pollutant reductions, 
which occurred due to implementation of the NAAQS program to justify 
MATS, could be viewed as double- or triple-counting of benefits.328  
EPA admitted that the majority of the total benefits are due to reduction 
of particulate matter and sulfur dioxide, which as criteria pollutants 
rather than hazardous pollutants, are subject to “stringent” regulations 
under the separate NAAQS.329 
A remaining issues is where PM2.5 is reduced below its NAAQS 
standards, which already provide an “adequate margin of safety” to 
human health, whether counting additional reductions in PM2.5 occurring 
in already-NAAQS-compliant areas is a countable benefit from a MATS 
rule unrelated to PM2.5 ?330  This matter and its issues bear a close 
resemblance to the Clean Power Plan dispute,331 also counting a very 
large amount of co-benefits from reduction of other than the regulation’s 
targeted emissions CO2, and counting many international climate 
benefits which were eighty-five percent of total benefits in proportion to 
relatively limited domestic climate benefits, evaluated against 
substantial future 100 percent domestic compliance costs.332  
 
 328. Comments of the National Mining Association on Supplemental Finding That It Is 
Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal-and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generation Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 75,025 (Dec. 1, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-
20531&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
 329. Id. 
 330. SUSAN E. DUDLEY, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. REGULATORY STUDIES CTR., 
PUBLIC INTEREST COMMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S PROPOSED 
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY TO REGULATE 
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS FROM COAL AND OIL FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM 
GENERATING UNITS (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-
20527&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf; see also MATS 
RIA Final, page 224. “Approximately 11% of the avoided premature deaths occur at or above 
an annual mean PM2.5 level of 10 µg/m3 (the LML of the Laden et al. 2006 study), and about 
73% occur at or above an annual mean PM2.5 level of 7.5 µg/m3 (the LML of the Pope et. al. 
2002 study). As we model avoided premature deaths among populations exposed to levels of 
PM2.5 that are successively lower than the LML of each study our confidence in the results 
diminishes.” See also http://www.iseepi.org/Docs/PM2.5_LettertoEPA__posting.pdf. The 
International Society for Environmental Epidemiology (ISEE) responding to the EPA’s 
invitation for comments on NAAQS standards update, recommends to reduce annual PM2.5 to 
the level of ten µg/m3 as recommended by WHO’s assessment that “adverse effects on health 
cannot be entirely ruled out even below that level.” See also MATS RIA Final, fig. 5-15. 
 331. See Section III.C. 
 332. See supra note 184. 
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 While the Michigan Court suggested that agencies should 
generally consider costs in regulatory decision-making, it also made 
clear that “it will be up to the agency to decide . . .  how to account for 
cost.”333  In Michigan, both the majority and the dissent took pains to 
make clear that they were not requiring agencies “to conduct a formal 
cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is 
assigned a monetary value.”334  However, they had to reasonably 
consider costs.335  The ultimate question remains whether a regulation is 
reasonable if its actual targeted costs dramatically exceed the benefits of 
the rule.  Fifteen states—Michigan, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming—sued EPA 
in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia again in 2016, for 
re-affirming its originally Supreme Court remanded MATS rule.336  
Several recent decisions of the Supreme Court scrutinize deference 
to the executive branch.  In UARG v. EPA, the Supreme Court 
highlighted that where a statutory interpretation by EPA “would bring 
about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory 
authority,” a court should demand prior “clear congressional 
authorization.”337  The challengers to the CPP regulation relied on this 
language from UARG and King v. Burwell to argue in their brief: 
EPA…purports to have discovered sweeping authority in Section 
111(d) of the Clean Air Act — a provision that has been used only 
five times 147 in 45 years—to issue a “Power Plan” that forces States 
to fundamentally alter electricity generation throughout the country.   
But as the Supreme Court recently said, courts should “greet … with 
a measure of skepticism” claims by EPA to have “discover[ed] in a 
long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant 
portion of the American economy” and make “decisions of vast 
economic and political significance,” [UARG], especially in areas 
outside an agency’s “expertise,”338 
The MATS rule is now languishing in the United States Court of 
Appeals of District of Columbia, as is the CPP challenge.  What both 
EPA regulations of MATS and CPP share in common is that in neither 
 
 333. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2702. 
 334. Id. at 2711. 
 335. Id.   
 336. See Mich. v. EPA, Petition for Review Case No. 16-1204 (D.C. Cir. June 24, 2016) 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Michigan_Attorney_General_Bill
_Schuette_v_US_Environmental_Protec?1469159801.   
 337. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013). 
 338. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 3-4, 23-35, 66, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14–114); 
King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 
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case had the executive branch calculated or created a record of the costs 
and benefits of the rules.  In each case, the costs were billions of dollars 
annually imposed not on the government, but on private stakeholders.  
In neither case, had the executive branch regulations been mandated or 
vetted by Congress.  And in each case, the reduction of the pollutant 
(mercury in the MATs rule and CO2 in the CPP, respectively) created a 
miniscule amount of direct public health benefits scaled against much 
more significant costs for private industry to implement the 
reductions.339 
In both cases, to alter the lopsided outcome of costs far exceeding 
direct benefits of the pollutant specifically regulated by the rule 
promulgated by the agency, EPA added estimated indirect incidental 
“co-benefits” related to reduction of pollutants which were not regulated 
by the rule.  This method of counting of so-called “co-benefits” is 
additive to the benefits side to the significant extent to flip the outcome 
of the cost/benefit analysis from negative to positive.  Soon after its 2015 
Michigan decision injecting costs into administrative law as a new 
prudential requirement,340 the Supreme Court took the rare step of 
staying enforcement of the EPA regulation which was the foundation of 
the Obama Administration’s climate change policy, more than two years 
before a challenge to the regulation could even reach it.341 
We are seeing a tectonic shift in the administrative state.  After the 
Michigan remand of regulations affecting coal-fired power plants, the 
Supreme Court took the rare step of staying enforcement of a second 
regulation, CPP affecting coal-fired power plants, which had similar cost 
issues, more than two years before a CPP challenge could even reach 
it.342  This alteration in the powers of the executive branch comes into 
even more sharp focus now that the new Trump Administration is 
stretching the contours of unilateral executive action.  Can an Executive 
agency any longer add estimated indirect incidental “co-benefits” not 
covered by what a rule regulates or addresses, to flip the apparent cost-
effectiveness and impact assessment of a proposed rule?  This calculus 
will alter the twenty-first century regulated state under evolving 
jurisprudence.   
What both stricken (MATs, the Michigan precedent) and stayed 
(the Clean Power Plan, Virginia/Murray stay) regulations shared in 
common is that in neither case had the executive branch calculated or 
created a sufficient record of the costs and benefits of the rules.  In each 
 
 339. See supra Section IV.D & III.C. 
 340. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2726. 
 341. See W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016). 
 342. Id. 
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case, the costs were billions of dollars annually imposed on private 
stakeholders, not the government.  And in each case, the reduction of the 
pollutant (mercury and CO2, respectively) created a miniscule amount of 
direct public health benefits scaled against much more significant costs 
for private industry to implement the reductions. 
The applications for a stay and granting it relied heavily on 
Michigan v. EPA,343 and UARG v. EPA.344 The stay of the Clean Power 
Plan reflects the progressive retreat from Chevron deference afforded to 
agency decisions, incorporated in UARG v. EPA,345 King v. Burwell,346 
and Michigan v. EPA.347  These cases shift the balance of power to 
construe Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts. 
V. STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: IMPACT OF CPP STAY OR REPEAL 
Some are now noting that the thirty-two percent reduction the 
Obama Administration CPP was designed to achieve between 2022-
2030 for CO2 reductions, in fact, was and is occurring anyway more than 
five years before the CPP would have started to exert any effect.348  A 
recent analysis by the Rhodium Group estimated that United States 
electricity emissions are currently on track to fall twenty-seven to thirty-
five percent below baseline 2005 levels by 2030, even if the CPP 
regulation is repealed.349  This is approximately in the range of what the 
thirty-two percent reduction that the Clean Power Plan originally sought 
to mandate.350  In Virginia, a state with a large amount of coal-fired 
power generation, between 2000-2014, without the CPP in place during 
those fifteen years, the state reduced power plant CO2 emissions by thirty 
percent.351  Achieving only half that amount of additional reductions in 
the remaining sixteen years from 2014-2030 would meet the CPP 
requirements.352 
 
 343. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08.   
 344. UARG, 134 S. Ct. 2427. The application of the twenty-nine states for a stay referred 
to and relied on UARG v. EPA throughout. 
 345. Id. at 2444 (disfavoring new agency interpretation). 
 346. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89 (2015) (disregarding opinion of non-
expert agencies). 
 347. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs 
before regulation). 
 348. John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, What the CPP Would Have Done, RHODIUM GRP. 
(Oct. 9, 2017), http://rhg.com/notes/what-the-cpp-would-have-done. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. VIRGINIA DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, PRESENTATION TO THE GOVERNOR’S ORDER 
57 WORKGROUP, VIRGINIA’S CARBON REDUCTION EFFORTS (Aug. 31, 2016), 
https://www.naturalresources.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/secretary-of-natural-
resources/pdf/deq-eo-57-presentation.pdf. 
 352. Id. 
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CPP is not responsible for any CO2 reductions during the Obama 
Administration, since it was not promulgated until 2015 and requires no 
reductions until 2022, well after the current four-year term of the Trump 
Administration.353  The CPP would require nothing until its first 
requirements beginning in 2022, assuming that it is not delayed by 
litigation, which is currently occurring.354  The final CPP rule was 
released in 2015, with its numbers based on 2014 energy market 
projections.355 In the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) released that year, 
the U.S. Department of Energy, and the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) projected only modest recovery in power sector 
CO2 emissions from 2012 lows to eight percent below 2005 levels by 
2030.356  If the U.S. is on track to achieve a thirty-two percent reduction 
from 2005 CO2 levels, it has been achieving this in the past decade 
without a federal CPP or MATs regulations.  
The Rhodium Group consultants’ projections estimate that power 
sector CO2 emissions would achieve twenty-seven to thirty-five percent 
reductions below 2005 levels even without the CPP or any element of it 
legally in force.357  This forecast is based on lower cost electricity supply 
due to greater supply of natural gas from hydro-fracking technology 
which supply suppresses price, more aggressive lower-cost renewable 
energy development, and flatter demand for electric power than the U.S. 
Department of Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicted: 
Gas prices have stayed lower for longer than EIA predicted, 
electricity demand has remained flat, rapidly declining wind and 
solar costs and a multi-year extension of the PTC and ITC have 
driven aggressive renewable energy deployment, and many coal-
fired power plants have been retired.358 
 
 353. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 354. See Jonathan H. Adler, Placing the Clean Power Plan in Context, WASHINGTON 
POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2016/02/10/placing-the-clean-power-plan-in-
context/?utm_term=.f4b07aaf7e5d. 
 355. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348. 
 356. See id. at fig. 3. The CPP was projected to reduce power sector CO2 emissions thirty-
two percent below 2005 levels by 2030. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. 
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The Rhodium analysis illustrates that the U.S. could achieve the 
2032 CPP-required levels of CO2 reduction from power plants a full 
decade in advance of that deadline from operating economic forces even 
without the CPP ever in force.359  The U.S. could achieve the CPP 2032 
carbon reduction goal by 2020 and maintain this level to 2032.360  By 
this forecast of trends, the power sector carbon reduction objective is 
being achieved by basic economic forces, notwithstanding CPP 
regulation and the legal controversy surrounding it. 
Figure 3. Current Power Sector CO2 Projections and EPA CPP 
Target361 
 
Under the CPP, states would have had the option to allow power 
plants to trade compliance credits with power generation plants in other 
states.362  The CPP allows states to trade compliance credits and 
therefrom to claim or achieve CO2 reduction compliance without a state 
itself reducing CO2 emissions at all or to the degree required.363  Surplus 
credits could be purchased by facilities in another state to show, paper 
“compliance” without reducing emissions inside the fence line of that 
state’s power generation facilities.364  Rhodium’s study assumed that all 
states took advantage of trading to minimize costs where credit 
purchases were less expensive than actual in-state reductions, whereby 
the CPP in fact would have achieved no additional emission reductions 
in the future compared to business-as-usual, assuming that natural gas 
 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. See also Figure 3.   
 361. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348. 
 362. Id. 
 363. FACT SHEET: CLEAN POWER PLAN OVERVIEW, supra note 34. 
 364. See Emily Holden & Elizabeth Harball, EPA Clean Power Plan: Start Trading 
Carbon, Please, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/epa-clean-power-plan-start-trading-carbon-
please/. 
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remains cheap and renewable energy costs decline rapidly, as both have 
in recent years.365  This business-as-usual scenario without CPP would 
realize zero to seventy-two million metric tons a year of carbon reduction 
with credit trading and more expensive gas and renewables during the 
2022-2030 CPP compliance period.366  With the highest renewable 
energy and natural gas prices analyzed by Rhodium, twenty-one states 
would have had to take additional action to comply with the CPP than 
what they were already on track to achieve in the absence of the CPP 
rule.367 
Therefore, it is possible that the U.S. will achieve the CPP 
requirements and the Paris Accord international targets without the CPP 
in law and a decade ahead of schedule, based only on existing market 
forces and changes in power technology.  If so, all of the assumed 
benefits would be achieved without incurring the regulatory costs.  Time, 
over the next decade, will tell.  
 The Supreme Court in several decisions recently circumscribed 
court deference to administrative agency decisions.  Citing King v. 
Burwell, the states maintained that an agency would require explicit 
authority from Congress to regulate in an area in which it does not 
regularly participate.368  This Court stated that the retreat from Chevron 
agency deference is to be applied to matters of great “economic and 
political significance,” according to Chief Justice Robert in King.369 
By analogy here, the CPP, an environmental regulation, elects to 
accomplish its CO2 emission reductions by aggressive measures to 
reorganize how power is generated and sold in America.  This raises the 
issue whether such discretion to influence electricity production is 
within the authority of EPA without any separate Congressional 
authority or delegation, or whether such authority over electricity 
production resides within FERC and the U.S. Department of Energy to 
exercise.  FERC Commissioner Clark in Congressional testimony 
described the CPP and related EPA initiatives, from the perspective of 
the electric energy sector which FERC alone regulates in the United 
States, as a “jurisdictional train wreck.”370   
 
 365. See Larsen & Herndon, supra note 348. 
 366. Id. See Figure 3. 
 367. Id. 
 368. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015). 
 369. Id. at 2483. 
 370. Garner, supra note 1. 
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VI. TECHNOLOGY CHANGE INTERFACES WITH LAW 
 A. The Future for Coal 
The ongoing legal contest regarding the CPP presages the recent 
controversy on the use of coal to power the U.S. economy which was 
elevated to a major issue in the most recent presidential election.371  Yet, 
even before the future jobs of coal miners became a litmus issue in the 
2016 presidential contest,372 the Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
a significant Executive branch regulation because the agency failed to 
consider the costs that the regulation imposed on the U.S. economy.373  
The Obama Administration expressly declared that the CPP and MATs 
regulations were designed to frustrate ongoing and future use of coal in 
the United States for electric power generation.374 
EPA’s CPP rule states that the “book life” of a coal plant is forty 
years, and that states, in their compliance filings, should consider not 
allowing operation of older coal plants under this rule.375  EPA utilized 
a planning assumption which recommends that states and regional ISOs 
take natural gas combustion turbines, which were running only at a 
national forty to fifty percent operating capacity factor compared to their 
full potential, and increase those to a seventy-five percent operating 
capacity factor to displace coal-fired power, well within their ninety-one 
percent availability.376 
The U.S. electric system traditionally has used coal-fired resources 
as its principal prime mover power generation technology since the first 
harnessing of electricity in the United States 135 years ago.377  There are 
400 U.S. coal-fired powered plants378 which traditionally supplied more 
than half of U.S. electric power.379  In nineteen of the fifty U.S. states, 
 
 371. See Tim Boersma, Charles K. Ebinger, & Heather Greenley, The Presidential 
Candidates’ Views on Energy and Climate, BROOKINGS (June 9, 2016) 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/06/09/the-presidential-candidates-
views-on-energy-and-climate/. 
 372. See Nicolas Loris, The Many Problems of the EPA’s Clean Power Plan and Climate 
Regulations: A Primer, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/environment/report/the-
many-problems-the-epas-clean-power-plan-and-climate-regulations-primer. 
 373. See id. 
 374. See supra at notes 56-58. 
 375. 80 Fed. Reg. 64661, 64872. 
 376. Id. at 64,799-64,801. 
 377. See JAMES G. SPEIGHT, THE CHEMISTRY AND TECHNOLOGY OF COAL 13 (3d ed. 
2013); see also supra Figure 2. 
 378. John Myskens, Dan Keating, & Samuel Granados, Mapping How the United States 
Generates its Electricity, WASHINGTON POST (July 31, 2015) [hereinafter Myskens et al., 
Mapping], http://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/power-plants/. 
 379. See id.; See also Joby Warrick, White House Set to Adopt Sweeping Curbs on Carbon 
Pollution, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2015), 
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coal is the dominant source of electricity, and in thirteen of these 
nineteen states, coal supplies a majority of power generation.380  
With or without court endorsement and deference to the Obama 
Administration’s initiatives culminating in the CPP, the zenith of coal 
use in the U.S. is ebbing under current economic condition:  Coal for 
power generation has been rapidly decreasing in the most recent decade, 
to where it now supplies barely one-third of U.S. electric power, with its 
share continuing to decrease.381  There has been a dramatic exodus of 
coal: In 2012 there were 1,308 coal-fired generating units in the United 
States, totaling 310 Gigawatts (Gw) of capacity, of which 10.2 Gw of 
coal-fired capacity retired in 2012, and more each year since.382  Sixty 
Gw of existing coal-fired power generation capacity are estimated to be 
shuttered between 2015 and 2020, with ninety percent of this coal 
decrease having occurred by 2016.383  U.S. coal-fired generating 
capacity is projected to decrease to 262 Gw in 2040, which would 
constitute a fifteen percent decrease, according to the U.S. Energy 
Information Agency.384   
B. Renewable Energy Escalation 
Natural gas powered generation and renewable electric energy 
quickly are supplanting coal generation in the last five years.385  During 
the past decade the price of implementing many renewable energy 
alternatives has dropped dramatically.386 For example, the cost of wind 
power has dropped within the range of being competitive with the price 
of some more traditional fossil fuel resources for the production of 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/white-house-set-to-adopt-
sweeping-curbs-on-carbon-pollution/2015/08/01/ba6627fa-385c-11e5-b673-
1df005a0fb28_story.html. 
 380. Myskens, et al., Mapping, supra note 378. 
 381. See Wendy Koch, EPA Seeks 30% Cut in Power Plant Carbon Emissions by 2030, 
USA TODAY (June 3, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/06/02/epa-proposes-sharp-cuts-
power-plant-emissions/9859913/. 
 382. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., AEO2014 PROJECTS MORE COAL-FIRED POWER 
PLANT RETIREMENTS BY 2016 THAN HAVE BEEN SCHEDULED, 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=15031 (last updated Mar. 10, 2014). 
 383. Michael Bastasch, Report: EPA Regulations to Accelerate Coal Plant Shutdowns, 
DAILY CALLER (Feb. 14, 2014), http://dailycaller.com/2014/02/14/report-epa-regulations-to-
accelerate-coal-plant-shutdowns/. 
 384. Id. 
 385. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NATURAL GAS, RENEWABLES PROJECTED TO 
PROVIDE LARGER SHARES OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION, (May 4,2015), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21072. 
 386. See infra notes 393-98. 
1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2019  4:24 PM 
2019] A LEGAL “JURISDICTIONAL TRAIN WRECK” 61 
electricity.387  Wind, along with natural gas, has dominated new sources 
of electric energy deployed in the most recent decade.388 
Use of renewable energy continues to grow rapidly in the United 
States. In 2013, electricity generated from renewable energy 
technologies, including conventional hydropower, represented thirteen 
percent of total U.S. electricity, up from nine percent in 2005.389  In 2012, 
wind energy was the most deployed new U.S. electricity generation 
capacity, contributing forty-three percent of all new electric 
generation.390  Wind energy provided 4.5 percent of total U.S. power 
supplies in 2013.391  Since 2009, U.S. wind generation has tripled and 
solar generation has grown twentyfold.392 
The cost to install photovoltaic solar panels has fallen 
dramatically; PV module prices have experienced a decline from 
around 1.90 dollars per watt in 2009 to 0.36 dollars per watt in 2017, 
and lower in some regions of the world.393 Inverter prices, for the 
equipment necessary to convert photovoltaic direct current to 
alternating current so that it can be moved on the grid, have also 
declined by more than sixty percent in cost from 0.60 to 1.00+ dollars 
per watt in 2005 to under 0.20 dollars per watt in 2013.394  This has 
allowed the solar photovoltaic market to grow at an average rate of 
more than forty percent each year since 2000.395  Solar energy was 
forecasted to be cost competitive with retail electricity prices in forty-
 
 387. Tara Patel, Fossil Fuels Losing Cost Advantage Over Solar, Wind, IEA Says, 
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-31/solar-
wind-power-costs-drop-as-fossil-fuels-increase-iea-says. 
 388. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR INDUSTRY DATA: SOLAR INDUSTRY 
GROWING AT A RECORD PACE 2-3 (2018) http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-
industry-data. 
 389. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,695 (referencing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2015 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2040 ES-6 (2015)). 
 390. Energy Dept. Reports: U.S. Wind Energy Production and Manufacturing Reaches 
Record Highs, ENERGY.GOV, (Aug. 6, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/energy-dept-reports-
us-wind-energy-production-and-manufacturing-reaches-record-highs. 
 391. Clean Power Plan, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,803 (citing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
MONTHLY ENERGY REVIEW 106 tbl. 7.2b (May 2015)). 
 392. See id. 
 393. WILSON RICKERSON, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY RENEWABLE ENERGY TECH. 
DEPLOYMENT (IEA-RETD), RESIDENTIAL PROSUMERS-DRIVERS AND POLICY OPTIONS 
(RE-PROSUMERS) 9 (Holly Wilson & Henry Barrett eds., Meister Consultants Group, 2014) 
(relying on Jade Jones, Regional PV Module Pricing Dynamics: What You Need to Know, 
GREEN TECH MEDIA (Nov. 22, 2013)); Nicholas Rinaldi, Solar PV Module Costs to Fall to 
36 Cents per Watt by 2017, GREEN TECH MEDIA (June 18, 2013). 
 394. RICKERSON, supra note 393, at 9 (relying on Ian Clover, IHS cuts global inverter 
market forecast in face of dramatic price drops, PV MAG. (Oct. 16, 2013). See also 
NAVIGANT CONSULTING INC., A REVIEW OF PV INVERTER TECHNOLOGY COST AND 
PERFORMANCE PROJECTIONS 3 (Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab. 2006)). 
 395. RICKERSON, supra note 393, at 10. 
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seven U.S. states by 2016, with maintenance of current subsidies, 
according to Deutsche Bank.396  Solar electric energy is now cost-
competitive with traditional fossil fuels due to substantial subsidies397 
and it is projected to dramatically expand in use in the coming decade.398   
Figure 4 
 
In a recent six-year period, the costs of solar photovoltaic cells and 
wind power has decreased by forty to sixty percent.  See Figure 5.  The 
global market for renewable energy is projected to grow to 460 billion 
dollars per year by 2030.399 Wind is now the predominant new power 
generation source added each year.400 As solar energy becomes the first 
choice for power generation technology for consumers, renewable 
 
 396. Ari Natter, Solar Energy to Reach ‘Grid Parity’ by 2016 In Nearly All States, 
Deutsche Bank Predicts, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 27, 2014). This is based on the assumption 
that the cost of solar systems will decline by about twenty percent more, from less than three 
dollars per watt installed to less than 2.50 dollars per watt installed by 2016, resulting in a 
price in those states from nine to fourteen cents/Kwh, and lowered financing cost for solar 
projects. The average cost of residential electricity in the U.S. in 2013 was 12.12 cents/Kwh, 
and was 8.95 cents/Kwh in 2004. These assumptions factor in ongoing U.S. subsidies from 
the thirty percent investment tax credit for solar energy, which is scheduled to drop to ten 
percent in the future. 
 397. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, IRENA POLICY BRIEF - RENEWABLES 
BECOMING MORE COMPETITIVE WORLDWIDE 1 (2012). 
 398. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR INDUSTRY DATA: SOLAR INDUSTRY 
GROWING AT A RECORD PACE 2-3 (2018), http://www.seia.org/research-resources/solar-
industry-data. 
 399. See BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FINANCE, GLOBAL RENEWABLE ENERGY MARKET 
OUTLOOK: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2011), http://bnef.com/WhitePapers/download/53.688. 
 400. See Roy L. Hales, ⅔ of New US Electricity Capacity Was from Wind in October, 
CLEAN TECHNICA, Nov. 24, 2014, http://cleantechnica.com/2014/11/24/two-thirds-of-us-
installations-were-from-the-wind-sector/. 
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energy will absorb almost two-thirds of the spending on new power 
plants over the next twenty-five years, dwarfing spending on fossil 
fuels.401 
Figure 5 
C. Natural Gas As Substitute Fuel 
New combined-cycle gas turbines, a spin-off technology from the 
aviation industry, have transformed the economics of the power 
industry, by providing a more efficient means to convert fossil fuel 
energy inputs to electric output.402  Gas-fired units burn a ‘cleaner’ fuel 
than coal, typically causing less maintenance expenses for units which 
burn coal compared to coal or oil.403  Natural gas combined cycle 
turbine facilities, which can be modified to increase by up to fifty percent 
of their start-up times to accommodate pressure and temperature 
transients of their steam turbines and readiness of their heat recovery 
steam generators, still may not be flexible enough to be able to follow 
and instantaneously respond to the ongoing intermittency caused by use 
of greater wind and solar power in the grid.404 
 
 401. Ehren Goossens, Renewables to Beat Fossil Fuels With $3.7 Trillion Solar Boom, 
BLOOMBERG (June 23, 2015). 
 402. See FERREY, LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER, supra note 84, at § 2.9. 
 403. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL, tbl. 8.4, 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html. 
 404. Nicolas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generation Plants in Integrating 
Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELEC. J. 33, 34 (2010); see Merrill Quintrell, 
Reducing Cycling Damage to Combined Cycle Steam Turbines, POWER (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.powermag.com/reducing-cycling-damage-to-combined-cycle-steam-turbines/. 
1_FERREY FINAL PROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/2019  4:24 PM 
64 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:59 
Hydro-fracking technology greatly increases the recoverable 
amount of underground natural gas in the United States and this 
technology is now being exported to the rest of the world.405  With 
more supply of natural gas methane, the price of gas in the U.S. market 
has dropped dramatically, and demand for it has increased equally 
dramatically.406  Within the previous five years, natural gas prices have 
fallen precipitously by one-third of their prior value, which was 
already low for the last ten years of natural gas prices from 2008 to the 
present. 407  They now are only a modest premium over coal prices 
compared on an equivalent energy value of the fuels.408   
Natural gas is now cost-competitive with the traditionally much 
cheaper cost of coal for power generation, and has the added benefit 
of gas producing only approximately one-half as much CO2 emissions 
as coal, no particulate matter criteria pollutants, no SO2 criteria 
pollutant emissions, and the ability to emit less NOx.409  Because of this 
new shale gas supply, the real price of natural gas in 2016 is below 
the price it was twenty years earlier in 1996.410 
 
 405. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Boom in American Liquefied Natural Gas Is Shaking Up 
the Energy World, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/business/energy-environment/liquified-natural-gas-
world-markets.html; see generally EPA, THE PROCESS OF HYDRAULIC FRACKING (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://perma.cc/PM9M-QCQ6 (Hydrofracking is a well-stimulation technique that 
employs high pressure fluids consisting of water, sand, and a mixture of chemicals to create 
and maintain small fissures in sub-surface shale rock, creating an escape path for otherwise 
trapped methane gas to move to perforated wellbores for extraction from the wells as a usable 
fuel). 
 406. MACROTRENDS, NATURAL GAS PRICES - HISTORICAL CHART, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/2478/natural-gas-prices-historical-chart (In January 2014, 
natural gas prices at the Henry Hub were 5.44 dollars per mmbtu, and were 3.53 dollars per 
mmbtu in November 2018, a decrease of thirty-five percent within this period of slightly less 
than five years, and a decrease of 76.8 percent from the price of 15.22 dollars per mmbtu in 
June 2008.); see also Blue Quadrant Capital Mgmt., The Outlook for U.S. Natural Gas Prices, 
2018-2019, SEEKING ALPHA (Oct. 25, 2017), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4116380-
outlook-u-s-natural-gas-prices-2018minus-2019. 
 407. See Gail Teverberg, Why U.S. Natural Gas Prices are so Low-Are Changes 
Needed?, OUR FINITE WORLD (Mar. 23, 2012), http://ourfiniteworld.com/2012/03/23/why-
us-natural- gas-prices-are-so-low-are-changes-needed/. 
 408. See Zachary Shahan, Low Costs of Solar Power & Wind Power Crush Coal, Crush 
Nuclear, & Beat Natural Gas, CLEAN TECHNICA (Dec. 25, 2016), 
https://cleantechnica.com/2016/12/25/cost-of-solar-power-vs-cost-of-wind-power-coal-
nuclear-natural-gas/. 
 409. See AM. GAS ASS’N, CLEANER ENERGY, http://www.aga.org/environmental-
benefits-natural-gas (last visited July 25, 2018); see UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 
COAL AND AIR POLLUTION, https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-
fuels/coal-air-pollution#.W-cLNxNKgdU. 
 410. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., HENRY HUB NATURAL GAS SPOT PRICE, 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngwhhdm.htm (last updated July 25, 2018). 
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  The projection of the U.S. Department of Energy is that there will 
be a significant increase in U.S. natural gas usage with a corresponding 
significant decrease in coal use in the next twenty-five years, as shown 
in Figure 6.411   
Figure 6412 
 
With these different technologies of coal, natural gas combined 
cycle (NGCC) generation, and wind and solar renewable energy, the 
future for U.S. energy will be determined by the least cost economics of 
power generation.413  In addition to the CPP, federal tax policy affects 
the economics of these choices.414  In 2015, there was a multi-year 
extension and phase-down of the renewable Production Tax Credit 
(PTC) which was previously scheduled to expire at the end of 2014 and 
is typically used by wind power projects and the Investment Tax Credit 
(ITC) which typically is used by solar power projects.415 Before 
Congress extended these programs, the PTC had expired at the end of 
the 2014 tax year, and the ITC was set to drop to a credit of ten percent 
of project costs at the end of 2016.416  At the end of 2015, the PTC was 
extended and phased out by 2020 while the ITC thirty percent tax credit 
declines to ten percent in 2021 and continues.417  
 
 411. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FOSSIL FUELS STILL DOMINATE U.S. ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION DESPITE RECENT MARKET SHARE DECLINE, (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=26912. 
 412. Id. 
 413. See supra note 410.  
 414. See FERREY, supra note 82, at §§ 3:53-3:59.115 (discussing federal tax policy 
affecting the power sector). 
 415. Id. at §§ 3:59.10, 3:59.40. 
 416. John Larsen & Whitney Herndon, Renewable Tax Extenders: The Bridge to the 
Clean Power Plan, RHODIUM GRP. (Jan. 27, 2016), http://rhg.com/notes/renewable-tax-
extenders-the-bridge-to-the-clean-power-plan (Please note that the figures reproduced in this 
article are no longer available on the website). 
 417. FERREY, supra note 84, at § 3:59. 
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As shown in Figure 7, coal use declines dramatically with or 
without these federal tax credits.  However, without the tax credits 
extended, in the left image in Figure 7, coal is replaced by natural gas 
NGCC units as the least-cost option; with the PTC and ITC extended in 
the right image in Figure 7, solar and wind power assume the dominant 
role through 2021, adding almost 300 Terawatt-hours (Twh) of 
generation in lieu of NGCC generation, and continue to be the 
technology of choice.418  This dominance of new renewable energy in 
lieu of natural gas and coal reduces U.S. carbon emissions.   
 
Figure 7.  Change in 2015-2030 Generation from Base Case with 
CPP with PTC and ITC419 
VII. SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The ongoing legal challenge to the CPP, more than two years after 
the Supreme Court enjoined the regulation even before a lower court 
decision on the merits,420 pivots on the Court’s Michigan decision.421  
Subject to the stay, the D.C. Circuit on its own motions has held back 
any ruling on the merits of the regulation in abeyance.422  Even the 
Michigan foundation is still not finally resolved before the D.C. Circuit, 
as is not the challenge to the Clean Power Plan.  Both of these still-
pending cases have in common the fact that:   
 
 418. Larsen & Herndon, supra note 416. 
 419. Id. “Other Clean” includes nuclear power, hydro, and biomass power. 
 420. W. Va. v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000; see Jonathan Adler, Supreme Court Put the Brakes 
on the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 9 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/09/supreme-court-
puts-the-brakes-on-the-epas-clean-power-plan/?utm_term=.dd512a870f71. 
 421. Mich. v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 422. W. Va. v. EPA, Case No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 8, 2017). 
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 Both were designed by the Obama Administration to discourage 
operation of coal-fired power plants 
 Both appear from EPA data to be not cost-effective unless 
unregulated criteria pollutant “co-benefits” are counted and/or 
international benefits (beyond U.S. borders and beyond U.S. 
legal authority to regulate extraterritorially) are counted 
Still unresolved in both pending Court matters is whether an 
executive agency can add estimated indirect incidental “co-benefits,” not 
included in what a rule regulates, as an additional operand to reverse 
lesser direct regulatory benefits than the rule’s costs?  The resolution of 
these cases of first impression reset future court deference to agencies.  
This withdrawal of deference recalibrates separation and weighting of 
powers among the branches of government.   
The indefinite stay of the Clean Power Plan is a key step in a 
progressive retreat from Chevron deference to agency decisions begun 
in 2014 in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,423 and continued in 2015 
in King v. Burwell424 and Michigan v. EPA.425  The CPP hovers in 
suspended legal animation after these decisions.  Underscoring the legal 
issue is the recent controversy on the use of coal versus renewable 
energy or other sources to power the U.S. economy, elevated to a major 
issue in the most recent presidential election.426  The CPP’s benefits only 
exceeded its costs due to the Obama Administration’s counting of 
unregulated “co-benefits” as well as extraterritorial international 
benefits outside of U.S. borders.427 The Trump Administration repeal of 
the CPP, estimated now to save thirty-three billion dollars in avoided 
compliance costs in 2030,428  no longer counts: 
 Mitigation benefits to climate occurring globally outside the 
United States over which the agency has no legal jurisdiction 
and which the regulation does not address 
 Indirect “co-benefits” of pollutants that the Plan does not regulate 
nor address429  
 
 423. UARG v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2013) (disfavoring new agency 
interpretation). 
 424. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (disregarding opinion of non-expert 
agencies). 
 425. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08 (prerequisite de novo agency consideration of costs 
before regulation). 
 426. See A. Parker & C. Davenport, Donald Trump’s Energy Plan:  More Fossil Fuels 
and Fewer Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2016 (“We’re going to bring back the coal industry, 
save the coal industry,” he said “I love those people.”). 
 427. See supra notes 182, 192-93. 
 428. See supra note 172. 
 429. See supra note 182. 
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More important than the unusual  legal predicate for this stay, is the 
retreat from Chevron deference, progressively etched by the Court in 
Michigan v. EPA,430 UARG v. EPA,431 and other recent decisions.432  
Michigan is the mirror opposite of traditional Chevron deference, a 
potential shift in Supreme Court reliance on quantitative, economic cost 
consideration in environmental regulation.433  The ongoing CPP 
litigation and MATs litigation raise legal issues of first impression that 
are redefining administrative deference, without “a jurisdictional train 
wreck.”434  These decisions shift the balance of power to construe 
Congressional statutes from the executive branch to the courts. 
 
 
 430. See Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08. 
 431. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2444. 
 432. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). 
 433. Mich., 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 434. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
